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PUBLISH, SHARE, RE-TWEET, AND REPEAT
Michal Lavi *

ABSTRACT
New technologies allow users to communicate ideas to a broad audience easily
and quickly, affecting the way ideas are interpreted and their credibility. Each and
every social network user can simply click “share” or “retweet” and automatically
republish an existing post and expose a new message to a wide audience. The
dissemination of ideas can raise public awareness about important issues and
bring about social, political, and economic change.
Yet, digital sharing also provides vast opportunities to spread false rumors,
defamation, and Fake News stories at the thoughtless click of a button. The
spreading of falsehoods can severely harm the reputation of victims, erode
democracy, and infringe on the public interest. Holding the original publisher
accountable and collecting damages from him offers very limited redress since the
harmful expression can continue to spread. How should the law respond to this
phenomenon and who should be held accountable?
Drawing on multidisciplinary social science scholarship from network theory
and cognitive psychology, this Article describes how falsehoods spread on social
networks, the different motivations to disseminate them, the gravity of the harm
they can inflict, and the likelihood of correcting false information once it has been
distributed in this setting. This Article will also describe the top-down influence of
social media platform intermediaries, and how it enhances dissemination by
exploiting users’ cognitive biases and creating social cues that encourage users to
share information. Understanding how falsehoods spread is a first step towards
providing a framework for meeting this challenge.
The Article argues that it is high time to rethink intermediary duties and
obligations regarding the dissemination of falsehoods. It examines a new
perspective for mitigating the harm caused by the dissemination of falsehood. The
Article advocates harnessing social network intermediaries to meet the challenge of
dissemination from the stage of platform design. It proposes innovative solutions
for mitigating careless, irresponsible sharing of false rumors.
The first solution focuses on a platform’s accountability for influencing user
decision-making processes. “Nudges” can discourage users from thoughtless
sharing of falsehoods and promote accountability ex ante. The second solution
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focuses on allowing effective ex post facto removal of falsehoods, defamation,
and fake news stories from all profiles and locations where they have spread.
Shaping user choices and designing platforms is value laden, reflecting the
platform’s particular set of preferences, and should not be taken for granted.
Therefore, this Article proposes ways to incentivize intermediaries to adopt these
solutions and mitigate the harm generated by the spreading of falsehoods. Finally,
the Article addresses the limitations of the proposed solutions yet still concludes
that they are more effective than current legal practices.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, a man named Ariel Ronis came across a defamatory
post on Facebook accusing him of racism. The post was not restricted to the publisher’s friends but was public to all Facebook users.
Over 6,000 individuals disseminated the post using the “share”
button, without knowing whether the statements made about this
person were actually true. Recipients of the post continued to share
it while some even added comments condemning Ronis. The post
went viral as it spread rapidly and garnered media attention. The
man felt his good reputation was ruined and ended up committing
1
suicide.
In the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle, falsehoods and
fake news were spread about both candidates. For example, it was
2
rumored that Hillary Clinton helped to fund and arm ISIS, that
she and her campaign chief were running a pedophilia ring from
the basement of a pizza parlor, 3 and that the Pope had endorsed
Donald Trump, 4 even though none of this had actually happened.
Many believe that these rumors and others like them influenced the
results of the elections.
The advent of technology and social media have revolutionized
interpersonal communication. Within seconds, a message or a post
5
can travel around the world and be viewed by thousands of users.
Individuals publish and spread messages thoughtlessly and almost
automatically at the click of a button (e.g., publish, share, retweet). Sharing information has many benefits. Each and every internet user can replicate valuable ideas and raise public awareness
of important issues, even though they are not affiliated with a press
organization. As a result, free speech has become easily accessible

1. This is the story of Ariel Ronis, an official from Israel’s Population, Immigration
and Border Crossing Authority, part of the Ministry of Interior, who shot himself to death
after a Facebook post accusing him of racism went viral. See Interior Ministry Official Commits
Suicide After Accusation of Racism Goes Viral, JERUSALEM POST (May 24, 2015, 2:50 AM), https:
//www.jpost.com/israel-news/interior-ministry-official-commits-suicide-after-accusation-ofracism-goes-viral-403924 [hereinafter RONIS].
2. See YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 139–44
(2018) (“The ‘Hillary helped fund and arm ISIS’ story depends on a rich shared narrative
created by media that have longer and deeper purchase on the minds of those who are exposed to it.”).
3. See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
4. Id. at 142.
5. See Haewook Kwak, Changhyun Lee, Hosung Park & Sue Moon, What Is Twitter, a
Social Network or a News Media?, 19 INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB 591, 591 (2010) (finding that every re-tweeted tweet on Twitter will reach an average audience of 1,000 people
regardless of the number of the original publisher’s followers).
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to all. This brave new technological world has enabled individuals
to voice their opinions on important social, political, and economic issues.
Yet, there is a flip side. Information wants to be free, but so does
misinformation. The information revolution allows for the vast
spreading of rumors, speculations, and assumptions about private
individuals and public figures without any checks on the accuracy
of the content. False rumors, defamation, and fake news stories are
amazingly powerful and dangerous; it is difficult to reverse them; 6
they can have serious consequences for a person’s reputation, and
7
they can even cost life. Falsehoods can also cause harm to their
audiences and to society in general. 8 In rare cases, false stories can
even result in physical harm to the recipients of the rumor. For example, fake news regarding potential cures for the Covid-19 pandemic resulted in people consuming “miracle cure[s]” that caused
physical damage. 9 Such “misinformation pose[s a] threat to public
10
health.”
Moreover, as false rumors spill into the digital ecosystem, they
11
pollute the flow of information. Consequently, it becomes more
and more difficult to distinguish between true and false information and to engage in truthful discussions on matters of public
importance. Thus, politics, democracy, and the public interest in
general are impaired. 12
Spreading falsehoods raises complex challenges as the more
times people are exposed to falsehoods, the more credible they
6. See Neil Levy, The Bad News About Fake News, 6 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY REV. & REPLY
COLLECTIVE 20, 20 (2017) (“[F]ake news is more pernicious than most of us realise, leaving
long lasting traces on our beliefs and our behavior even when we consume it know [sic] it
is fake or when the information it contains is corrected.”).
7. See, e.g., RONIS, supra note 1.
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387,
388 (2020) (“Some falsehoods are harmful. They ruin lives. They lead people to take unnecessary risks or fail to protect themselves against serious dangers.”).
9. Hugo Mercier, Opinion, Fake News in the Time of Coronavirus: How Big Is the Threat?,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
/2020/mar/30/fake-news-coronavirus-false-information (describing a man exposed to fake
news on the cure for Covid-19 who “ingest[ed] a product meant to clean fish tanks, as it
contains chloroquine, a drug currently being tested (inconclusively so far) as a treatment for
Covid-19” and died as a result).
10. See COVID-19 Global Roundup: Conspiracy and Fake News Challenge Public Health and Big
Tech, CGTN (May 13, 2020, 4:27 PM), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-13/COVID-19Global-Roundup-Conspiracy-and-fake-news-a-test-for-big-tech-QsqUXgDpHa/index.html.
11. See Omri Ben Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 105, 112–13 (2019)
(treating “fake news” as “data pollution” that disrupts social institutions and public interests
in a similar manner to environmental pollution).
12. See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in a
Post-Truth World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535, 540 (2020); Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 144–45 (2019); Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 68 (2017).
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13

become. These falsehoods start to feel so true that people believe
14
them even when provided with evidence of their falsity. Research
reveals that falsehoods “diffused significantly farther, faster, deep15
er, and more broadly” than truthful content, and in many cases,
private efforts to refute a falsehood by publishing the truth not only fail to cancel out the falsehood’s impact but can even increase its
16
credibility. Even when attempts to correct a falsehood do succeed
in mitigating its influence, their effect remains limited, as they are
17
often less widely viewed than the original falsehood.
Victims of defamation can file suit when they have access to the
alleged defamer’s name. In their terms of service, many social networks such as Facebook and Linkedin require users to provide
18
their real names. Thus, victims of defamation can file a lawsuit
19
against the publisher. Filing an action against the original speaker
and collecting damages, however, provides very limited redress because it cannot counteract complications arising from the wide13. Gerd Gigerenzer, External Validity of Laboratory Experiments: The Frequency-Validity Relationship, 97 AM. J. PSYCH. 185, 185, 192–93 (1984) (“[M]ere repetition of plausible but unfamiliar assertations increases the belief in the validity of the assertations, independent of
their actual truth or falsity.”).
14. Whitney Phillips, The Toxins We Carry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Fall 2019),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/truth-pollution-disinformation.php (“It shows that
when people are repeatedly exposed to false statements, those statements start to feel true,
even when they are countered with evidence. In short, a fact check is no match for a repeated lie.”).
15. Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News Online,
359 SCI. MAG. 1146, 1147 (2018).
16. See Gordon Pennycook, Tyrone D. Cannon & David G. Rand, Prior Exposure Increases
Perceived Accuracy of Fake News, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 1865 (2018). Research also shows
that false information might psychologically cancel out the influence of truthful statements.
See Sander van der Linden, Anthony Leiserowitz, Seth Rosenthal & Edward Maibach, Inoculating the Public Against Misinformation About Climate Change, 1 GLOB. CHALLENGES 1, 2, 5
(2017).
17. See Mark Scott & Melissa Eddy, Europe Combats a New Foe of Political Stability: Fake
News, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), nyti.ms/2SEP0ej (discussing the unsuccessful trials of EU
teams to correct fake news due to their dissemination).
18. See Terms of Service 3.1, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php
[https://perma.cc/PE52-AGWJ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (“[U]se the same name that you
use in real life.”); User Agreement 2.1(2), LINKEDIN (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com
/legal/user-agreement [https://perma.cc/M2TS-EWAY] (“[Y]ou will only have one
LinkedIn account, which must be in your real name.”); Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto Nuno
Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: The “Soft eID” Conundrum, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1336–37 (2013) (referring to the possibility of removing or blocking
profiles that do not reflect a real identity); This Woman Changed Her Name Just so She Could
Log In to Facebook, TIME (July 13, 2015, 1:17 AM), https://time.com/3955056/facebooksocial-media-jemma-rogers-uk/ [https://perma.cc/SH23-EYJ6] (after creating an alias for
her Facebook account, a woman resorted to legally changing her name to avoid being
locked out of her account).
19. See, e.g., Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019) (dismissing a defamation
case because the defendant added question marks to his allegedly defamatory tweets); see
also Patrick H. Hunt, Comment, Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559 (2013) (reviewing defamation lawsuits regarding libel claims for statements posted on Twitter, referred to as “twibel claims”).
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spread dissemination of falsehoods. In this context, § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) reflects the “internet exceptionalism” that “diverge[s] from regulatory precedents in other
20
media.” It directs that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any in21
formation provided by another information content provider.”
Courts have interpreted § 230 broadly as providing immunity to internet users who share information of other users who are not providers. 22 Consequently, lawsuits against disseminators of posts authored by third parties are usually blocked. Moreover, filing an acaction against all users who share a falsehood is impractical due to
their large number and the administrative costs of filing an action
against each and every one of them. It might also be unfair to hold
an individual accountable for content he did not originally author
because, unlike conventional news outlets that have a duty to de23
vote time and resources to vetting stories prior to publication, a
private citizen cannot be expected to ascertain the credibility of
such content let alone have a duty to do so once content has al24
ready been published online. Imposing liability on disseminators
may also deter individuals from social sharing of content and have
25
a chilling effect on free speech. It can also dilute the liability of
the person who created and published a post and, therefore, re-

20. Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG
(Mar. 11, 2009), https://bit.ly/2KGhOkP; see also John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org
/cyberspace-independence; JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE
INTERNET 77–78 (2019).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230. For further discussion of this provision, see infra Section II.A.
22. See KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 145–47; see also, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510,
529 (Cal. 2006) (“Nor is there any basis for concluding that Congress intended to treat service providers and users differently.”). It should be noted however that if the defendant authored content that accompanies republished content, he might become a provider of content and § 230 might not apply. See La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020); Loeb &
Loeb LLP, La Liberte v. Reid, LEXOLOGY (July 15, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=2e200267-569e-41aa-b7eb-f04939246c8b (“Reid herself had authored the
content that accompanied the photograph of La Liberte and did not merely republish the
photograph from another ‘information content provider.’ ”).
23. See Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230 Immunity,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1511–12 (2015) (exploring traditional standards of liability for
defamation and explaining that traditional publishers face strict liability).
24. See Matt C. Sanchez, Note, The Web Difference: A Legal and Normative Rationale Against
Liability for Online Reproduction of Third-Party Defamatory Content, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 301,
311, 319–20 (2008) (explaining that unlike traditional media, “online speakers as a class do
not have the experience or resources” to verify “the facts contained in every piece of information they reproduce,” and, therefore, they should not bear liability).
25. For more in the related context of intermediaries (websites or public pages) that
republish users’ content and make it more visible, see Michal Lavi, Taking Out of Context, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 145, 179–80 (2017).
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26

duce his incentives to prevent harm. It would also have adminis27
trative costs that exceed its benefits.
Due to these considerations, this Article does not focus on the
liability of users who disseminate third-party falsehoods. Instead, it
focuses on online intermediaries, such as Facebook and Twitter,
that design network tools and facilitate social sharing of organic
28
content for profit.
This Article further focuses on the extensive dissemination of
negative false rumors through social media. The discussion is not
limited to fake news about politicians and public figures but extends to lies and defamation about ordinary people. It focuses on
social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, due to their centrality and the socio-technological context, which facilitates sharing
valuable content easily while also exacerbating speech-related
harm.
The liability and accountability of intermediaries for user content currently exists in the realm of policy discussion; the law does
29
not yet provide solutions to the problem of spreading falsehoods.
This Article aspires to bridge the gap by proposing to harness intermediaries to the mission of mitigating the dissemination of
falsehoods. It proposes to promote accountability from the stage of
platform design. It aims to offer an ex ante solution for accommodating the challenge of spreading falsehoods at the stage of the user’s decision to post the falsehood and share it. It also proposes an
ex post solution for mitigating the harm of falsehoods that have already been shared. Keeping this goal in mind, the Article is divided
into the following parts:
Part I describes how ideas spread online. Drawing on network
theory, psychology, marketing, and information systems, it outlines

26. Ronen Perry, The Law and Economics of Online Republication, 106 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 32–36), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3552301# (presenting the theory of dilution of liability and expanding it to liability of
republishers).
27. Id. at 38 (addressing the administrative costs of legal actions against republishers).
28. See Kyunghee Lee, Byungtae Lee & Wonseok Oh, Thumbs Up, Sales Up? The Contingent Effect of Facebook Likes on Sales Performance in Social Commerce, 32 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 109,
110–11, 139 (2015) (explaining that social sharing enhances the flow of information, attracts users, and can be translated into sales). The Article addresses social sharing of organic
content and not targeting of advertisements by intermediaries. For expansion on ad targeting of political advertisements for profit, see Editorial, Twitter Is Banning Political Ads. If
Facebook Won’t, It Must at Least Moderate Them, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/twitter-is-banning-political-ads-if-facebookwont-it-must-at-least-moderate-them/2019/11/01/9d3457c0-fc01-11e9-ac8c-8eced29ca6ef_
story.html [https://perma.cc/GE93-5CVF].
29. The Article will address the current legal realm, which focuses on removal of harmful content ex post, allowing content to spread up until and even subsequent to removal. See
generally James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 217, 224–25
(2018).
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the myriad of motivations for spreading falsehoods. Afterwards, it
explores “bottom-up” social dynamics among users and “top-down”
influences of intermediaries on social network platforms. These
dynamics increase the likelihood that falsehoods will spread rapidly, inflicting severe harm on the defamed individual and the public’s interest.
Part II explores the law governing the secondary liability of intermediaries. It argues that with respect to spreading falsehoods,
current policy models fall short. Therefore, complementary mechanisms should be formulated. The Article will argue that due to the
growing power and influence of intermediaries on the flow of information, they should bear more responsibility. As a first step, intermediaries should be accountable for embedding complementary mechanisms to accommodate for the damages of replication
and dissemination of falsehoods.
Part III proposes solutions to mitigate the problem of spreading
falsehoods. It argues that intermediaries, which encourage users to
share content and profit from sharing, should promote user accountability. First, it suggests using “nudges” to influence user deci30
sions to share content. Nudges are expected to influence the context of user decision-making before publishing and sharing
content and have the potential to mitigate the spread of falsehoods
ex ante. The second solution focuses on efficient removal of harmful content ex post facto. Accordingly, an intermediary that designs
features for simplifying dissemination should provide technology
for efficient removal of the content shared from all profiles and locations. This solution is already applied by some social network
31
platforms. Choice architecture, however, “is value-laden, and reflects a particular set of preferences that should not be taken for
32
granted.” Thus, the Article proposes incentives for intermediaries
to adopt architecture for efficient removal and addresses their limitations. The proposals focus on the initial stage of platform design
that have a much better chance of hindering the spread of false-

30. See RICHARD THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 6 (2009) (defining a nudge as “any aspect of the choice
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives”).
31. For example, Facebook facilitates social sharing by embedding posts. Thus, if the
original post is deleted, the content becomes unavailable in the profiles it was embedded in.
See Embedded Posts, FACEBOOK, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/embeddedposts [https://perma.cc/TDV3-QB77] (last visited Sept. 19, 2020); Toby Headdon, An Epilogue to Swenson: The Same Old New Public and the Worms that Didn’t Turn, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
& PRAC. 662, 666 (2014) (explaining that embedded links allows efficient removal from
YouTube).
32. Michal Lavi, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Behavior, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597, 2671
(2019).
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hoods. These proposals could have been particularly useful during
the 2020 election cycle, as they mitigate the harm of defamation
and fake news stories to the reputation of individuals, including
candidates for president. By allowing intermediaries to correct
failures in the marketplace of ideas, the proposals promote people’s sense of reality, keeping them more invested in facts and real
news. Thus, the proposals also preserve the public interest.
I. SHARING CONTENT ON SOCIAL NETWORKS
Why do falsehoods spread within social networks? Bringing together multidisciplinary insights, this part explores the process of
dissemination online, explains the motivation behind spreading
falsehoods, and provides answers to this initial question. Afterwards, it explores the “bottom-up” social dynamics among users
and the “top-down” influence of intermediaries on social dissemination. It concludes that these dynamics can exacerbate the harm
caused by falsehoods.
A. Why Do False Rumors Spread?
Falsehoods, defamation, and fake news spread rapidly and gain
credibility. For example, in the 2016 U.S. election cycle, people
disseminated a fake story that the Pope endorsed Donald Trump,
33
and almost a million people shared it. Traditional media pointed
out the falsity of the story, but many voters could not care less.
Truth is no longer as important as seeming or feeling something to
be true since “people often tune in to ideologically resonant
34
sources of information,” engage in confirmation bias, resist information that is inconsistent with their ideology, and promote
their favorite narratives regardless of truth.
As technology advances, automation and artificial intelligence
now allow for the creation of deepfakes—believable videos, photos,
35
and audio of people doing and saying things they never did —that

33. Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Is in Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/opinion [https://perma.cc/6S5X-8HXM];
ZEYNEP TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED
PROTEST 264–65 (2017) [hereinafter TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS]
34. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 40.
35. Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes: A Looming Crisis for National Security,
LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deepfakes-looming-crisis-nationalsecurity-democracy-and-privacy# [https://perma.cc/KZ97-K9KP] (“Machine-learning algorithms . . . combined with facial-mapping software enable the cheap and easy fabrication of
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36

generates even greater manipulation of the truth. Liars can easily
avoid accountability, claiming that true statements are fake stories.
37
In contrast, truth-tellers can be portrayed as liars. Falsehoods
spread faster than truth, grab the attention of the audience, and
38
enhance dissemination. In this environment, false rumors have
particular importance. The internet enables these rumors to
spread even faster than previously and cause great harm to the
reputations of individuals in particular and society in general. But
what are the possible motives for publishing falsehoods in the first
place?
1. Motivations for Publishing Falsehoods
Propagators of false rumors have diverse motivations. 39 They can
40
spread falsehood intentionally, negligently, or recklessly. There
41
are four principle motives for publishing falsehoods. Some propagators are narrowly self-interested: by spreading falsehoods, they

content that hijacks one’s identity—voice, face, body.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 8, at
387, 419.
36. See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1759–60 (2019) (explaining the
emergence of machine learning through neural network methods that increase the capacity
to create false images, videos, and audio and that generative adversarial networks can lead to
the production of increasingly convincing and nearly impossible to debunk deep fakes);
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 423. Neural networks can also be used for AI creation of news stories that mimic the style and substance of real news stories. See Sarah Kreps, The Role of Technology in Online Misinformation, BROOKINGS: FOREIGN POLICY 1, 6 (2020), brook.gs/2Y6KzL1.
37. See Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News,” 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 234
(2018) (“In that spirit, President Trump has deployed the ‘fake news’ trope to demonize
and dismiss the traditional press as the ‘enemy of the American people.’ ”); Chesney & Citron, supra note 36, at 1785 (describing that difficulty in separating truth from falsehood allows a “liar’s dividend” because anyone can claim that a true story is fake while his lies are
the truth).
38. Vosoughi et al., supra note 15, at 1147.
39. ANDREW MARANTZ, ANTISOCIAL: ONLINE EXTREMISTS, TECHNO-UTOPIANS, AND THE
HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN CONVERSATION 120 (2019) (“[Y]ou can post something because
you believe it, or because you didn’t believe it and you wanted to see who would. You can
post something because you valued freedom of thought for its own sake; you can post something solely to get a reaction; you can post something without even knowing why, just because you felt like it.”).
40. BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 23–37 (differentiating between different types of
dissemination of political fake news under the umbrella of propaganda and dividing it into
four types: 1) manipulation- “directly influencing a person’s beliefs, attitudes, or preferences
in ways that fall short of what an empathetic observer would deem normatively appropriate
in the context”; 2) misinformation- “communication of false information without intent to
deceive, manipulate, or otherwise obtain an outcome”; 3) disinformation- “dissemination of
explicitly false or misleading information”; and 4) bullshit- “commercial actors with no apparent political agenda who propagate[] made-up stories to garner [business] engagements
and advertising revenue” and are indifferent to whether the stories are true or false).
41. See CASS R SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE
THEM, WHAT CAN BE DONE 12–15 (2009).
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aim to promote their own interest. In other words, they aim to
harm a particular person, group, or competitor in the political or
commercial realm and promote themselves by degrading their ri42
vals. “Other propagators are generally self-interested[: t]hey . . .
seek to attract [an audience] by spreading rumors.” 43 In contrast to
the narrowly self-interested, generally self-interested propagators
are indifferent to whether the rumor is true or false. Another type
of propagator is actually altruistic and disseminates rumors they be44
lieve to be true without checking the facts. Finally, malicious propagators intentionally seek to disseminate damaging information
45
about individuals and institutions simply to inflict harm.
2. Why Do People Disseminate Falsehoods?
An initial post may have a limited number of recipients; however, these recipients may then share it with others, leading to extensive dissemination and severe harm. Initiating a rumor is one
thing, but what makes another person spread it? Or, why do people share information in general?
The nature of the internet’s social environment fuels the distribution of ideas, information, and rumors at minimal cost. Constant
connection to the internet allows anyone to share information.
Thus, an idea can spread exponentially and reach a global audience at the click of a button. 46 Furthermore, as a falsehood circulates, it tends to become more menacing since the more individuals are exposed to a particular statement, the more likely they are
47
to believe it and perceive it as a known fact. Additionally, on the

42. For instance, individuals may spread rumors in order to make money, win a competition or political race, including by spreading negative, fake stories about competitors, or
otherwise to get ahead. See id.; see also, e.g., Ronan Bergman, Twitter Network Uses Fake Accounts
To Promote Netanyahu, Israel Watchdog Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/03/31/world/middleeast/netanyahu-fake-twitter.html [https://perma.cc
/XQ6M-36X8.
43. SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 13 (emphasis added); see JACOB SILVERMAN, TERMS OF
SERVICE: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PRICE OF CONSTANT CONNECTION 45 (2015) (explaining
that an important reason for publishing information is that people want to show others they
are active on the social network and get their attention).
44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 13.
45. See id. at 14.
46. The internet simplifies the dissemination of information and allows sharing with a
large audience with the click of a button. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES
IN CYBERSPACE (2014); LEE RAINIE & BARRY WELLMAN, NETWORKED: THE NEW SOCIAL
OPERATING SYSTEM 67 (2012); DAVID A POTTS, CYBERLIBEL: INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE
21ST CENTURY 30 (2011); Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919 (2010).
47. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND OTHER DANGEROUS IDEAS 25–27
(2014); NICHOLAS DIFONZO & PRASHANT BORDIA, RUMOR PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL AND
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internet, word-of-mouth information is not ephemeral. It remains
48
accessible indefinitely through a Google search. The more widely
shared a falsehood is, the higher it appears in Google and other
search engines’ results, leading to even greater exposure and caus49
ing users to ascribe it more and more relevance. Thus, the dissemination of a falsehood has the potential to cause tremendous
50
harm to a person’s reputation.
Yet, not all falsehoods are spread as extensively as others; some
are only disseminated locally. Why do some falsehoods spread
widely while others remain limited in reach? In his seminal work
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, Mark Granovetter introduced
the idea of “threshold” and maintains that it explains these pro51
cesses of adoption of behavior. Threshold refers to the proportion of the group that needs to join an activity before an individual
52
follows suit. Thus, “[o]ne’s social network has a huge potential to
53
affect one’s decisions to adopt and disseminate certain ideas” because people respond to the influences and preferences of oth54
ers.
55
A well-known U.S. election study serves as a good example.
Many Facebook users were shown a button to click to indicate that
they had voted. Clicking the button created and shared a post
about voter participation. For some users, the post included a
graphic sign and pictures of friends in the social network who also
indicated they had voted. “Researchers cross-referenced names
with actual voting records and found that those people who saw

ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES 225 (2007); Pennycook et al., supra note 16 (explaining that
the more people hear information, the more likely they are to believe it and pass it on).
48. See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 11
(2014); Daniel J. Solove, Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET 15, 15–19 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010); Lavi, supra note 32,
at 2603.
49. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE
SHOULD WORRY) 20–21 (2011); Bing Pan, Helene Hembrooke, Thorsten Joachims, Lori
Lorigo, Geri Gay & Laura Granka, In Google We Trust: Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, and
Relevance, 12 J. COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMMC’N 801 (2007); Lavi, supra note 32, at 2604.
50. See CITRON, supra note 46, at 197–99.
51. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOCIO. 1420, 1422
(1978).
52. Id.
53. Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 16 (2018).
54. See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED: THE SURPRISING
POWER OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES 127 (2009); Michal Lavi,
Content Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network Perspective, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 889 (2016).
55. Robert M. Bond, Christopher J. Fariss, Jason J. Jones, Adam D. I. Kramer, Cameron
Marlow, Jaime E. Settle & James H. Fowler, A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence
and Political Mobilization, 489 NATURE 7415 (2012), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature
11421. For a discussion of the study and its results, see Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335–36 (2014).

WINTER 2021]

Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat

453

posts [indicating] that their friends [had] voted were more likely
56
to vote” themselves.
In addition to collective thresholds, each individual has his own
57
personal threshold for adopting and disseminating ideas. In this
context, one can identify three types of individuals. “Receptives”
are individuals who are already disposed to favor a newly presented
58
idea or share the same ideology. Therefore, they have the lowest
threshold and tend to adopt information they receive and pass it
59
on. Another group of disseminators is the “neutrals.” This group
has no inclination in favor or against an idea. If they notice that a
few people have accepted and disseminated an idea, they may
come to accept it and disseminate it as well. 60 Finally, there are the
“skeptics,” who have a high threshold for accepting and disseminating ideas and may have a prior disposition against certain ideas.
Skeptics require a great deal of information before accepting new
ideas. Once the evidence becomes overwhelming—and this evidence may include beliefs shared by many others—the skeptics will
61
follow suit and accept the idea.
Because individuals influence one another, ideas, including
62
falsehoods, can spread through informational cascades. In other
words, people disseminate falsehoods, because others previously
disseminated them, without holding a prior disposition or ideology
that supports them. When an increasing number of people believe
a falsehood, it can begin to appear credible and consequently influence others to believe it as well. Social pressure can also push
people to spread information. In such cases, “people think they
know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonethe63
less go along with the crowd in order to maintain their status.”

56. Lavi, supra note 53, at 15 n.79; Lavi, supra note 25, at 147 n.8; see also Zittrain, supra
note 55, at 335–36.
57. Granovetter, supra note 51, at 1423.
58. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 19–20; Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More
Speech Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (2014) (explaining that people have different prior beliefs and hence different degrees of skepticism and that “[i]ndividuals who
believe that the messenger is a truth teller” tend to give credence to their statements).
59. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 19 (explaining that the individual threshold depends on a person’s prior disposition regarding the information).
60. See id. at 20.
61. See id.; Lavi, supra note 53, at 17.
62. “Informational cascades are generated when individuals follow the statements or
actions of predecessors and refrain from expressing opposing opinions because they believe
their predecessors are right.” Lavi, supra note 32, at 2602 n.14. As a result, important information is omitted from the social network. See Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of
Deliberating Groups 2 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 215, 2008); see also, e.g., Matthew Salganik, Peter Dodds & Duncan Watts, Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCI. MAG. 854 (2006).
63. Lavi, supra note 53, at 18 n.107; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY
MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 91 (2006); Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 62.
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This is the phenomenon of reputation cascades. As the crowd
grows, the risk that a large number of people will believe entirely
64
false information becomes reality. Diffusion of ideas, trends, or
behavior starts slowly. The idea can, however, spread rapidly “when
a critical mass of individuals publicly share[s the] idea [and] a
65
‘tipping point’ occurs.”
The spreading and adoption of a rumor depends on encountering individuals with low thresholds who are willing to spread it further. When individuals are surrounded by peers with similar low
thresholds, the diffusion of a rumor can accelerate. Yet, overlapping social circles might create structural holes and hinder dissem66
ination. It is difficult, however, to predict these tipping points
when ideas are widely spread, as every individual in the network
has a different threshold and they operate in different types of
67
networks that can be random or homogenous. The threshold is
68
reliant on a variety of personal elements and social structures.
Changes in the social network’s composition, social structures, and
the transition path of an idea can significantly change the likeli69
hood of widespread dissemination. Social networks have a tremendous impact on the flow of information. They can withhold or
accelerate the dissemination of rumors and this is the key to understanding how information and, in particular, falsehoods are dis70
seminated.
Having presented the threshold as an important factor influencing the spread of rumors, the next section addresses the central
factors impacting the likelihood of reaching this threshold: the
strength of social network ties and the influence of online inter71
mediaries.

64.
65.

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 2.
Lavi, supra note 53, at 17; see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW
LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 12 (2002) (defining a tipping point as “the
moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling point”). These principles were demonstrated in many contexts such as diffusion of innovation. See EVERETT M ROGERS: DIFFUSION
OF INNOVATION (5th ed. 2003).
66. Cf. CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS: THEORIES, CONCEPTS
AND FINDINGS 158 (2012).
67. See Granovetter, supra note 51, at 1423 (demonstrating this point by using diffusion
of rumors).
68. Lavi, supra note 53, at 17; see also KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 156, 160–61 (2011).
69. See KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 159–61.
70. Cf. CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 54, at 3–32.
71. It should be noted that there are additional factors such as the interference of foreign countries, hackers, and the norms of traditional media in the context of fake news. Yet,
the main factors are “bottom-up” network structures and “top-down” influences of intermediaries on networks including manipulation through algorithms. For further information,
see BENKLER ET AL. supra note 2, at 8–23, which explains how network architecture, including a right-wing website that repeated fake news, allowed and exacerbated the spread of rumors ascribing corruption to Hillary Clinton during the 2016 U.S. election campaign and

WINTER 2021]

Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat

455

B. Connected: Network, Ties, and Social Structures
72
A social network is a set of relationships. These relationships
73
structure the flow of interactions and social life today. They are
always present, influencing our choices, actions, thoughts, feelings,
74
and desires. Social networks shape norms and impact every aspect
75
of the human experience.
Network theory explains how connections between discrete objects are created, develop, and change. 76 Sociologists of networks
focus on the influences of networks on communication patterns
and the ties between individuals rather than on what a given indi77
vidual thinks or does independently. These ties shape interactions
among members of social networks and, therefore, show how in78
formation is disseminated within social networks. Thus, studying
social networks can provide an enlightened understanding of so79
cial dynamics and information dissemination. Understanding social networks makes it possible to explain the flow of information
and is the first step towards outlining information policy for online
dissemination of rumors.
Sociologists have addressed how different types of ties on social
80
networks influence the flow of information. When information is
transmitted in a network characterized by strong ties (such as close

found that the structure of social networks was more important than intervention by Russian
hackers, Facebook algorithms, online echo chambers, or Cambridge Analytica. However,
these findings focused on the 2016 U.S. election campaign and do not purport to reach
general conclusions regarding the most influential factors for spreading false rumors on the
whole. Moreover, network structure and intermediaries both have an impact in directing the
flow of information; the factors influence each other, and both have significant sway on dissemination.
72. See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 54, at 9.
73. Lavi, supra note 54, at 889; see also Manuel Castells, Afterword: Why Networks Matter, in
NETWORK LOGIC 219, 221 (2004). On networks in general, see also JULIE E. COHEN,
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 40
(2019) (“A network is a mode of organization in which hubs and nodes structure the flows of
transactions and interactions.”).
74. Lavi, supra note 54, at 889.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 890; cf. KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 27. Kadushin’s book focuses on social
networks and sociological theory. For a wider understanding of network science, see generally DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2004); and ALBERTLÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2014).
77. Lavi, supra note 54, at 890; see also BARABÁSI, supra note 76; KADUSHIN, supra note
66, at 27; RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 46, at 42; cf. Caroline Haythornthwaite, Social Networks and Internet Connectivity Effects, 8 INFO. COMMC’N. & SOC’Y, 125, 127 (2005).
78. Lavi, supra note 54, at 889–90; see also CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 54, at 7–9.
79. Lavi, supra note 54, at 890.
80. See e.g., Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOCIO. 1360, 1361
(1973); Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOCIO.
THEORY 201 (1983) [hereinafter Granovetter, A Network Theory Revisited]; Ronald S. Burt, The
Network Structure of Social Capital, 22 RSCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 345, 345–49, 353, 359
(2000).
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friends and family), the recipient ascribes credibility to the infor81
mation because he knows and trusts its source. In addition, interdependency between people increases social pressure and the likelihood
82
of crossing the threshold and disseminating an idea. Information
transmitted in this kind of network tends to spread quickly among followers but slows down outside the cluster of ties due to overlapping
social circles that hinder dissemination between distant parts of the
83
social network. In contrast, weak ties facilitate fast dissemination of
information. In fact, they can bridge the structural holes between
non-overlapping clusters of strong ties. 84 Yet, individuals who receive
85
information via weak ties may ascribe it less weight.
The following two subsections focus on the dissemination of
rumors on social network platforms. Section I.C describes briefly
the social structures of these platforms and their “bottom-up” influences on dissemination, and Section I.D describes the “topdown” influences of intermediaries on these platforms. Due to
these dynamics, it argues that social network platforms lend a high
probability of users meeting their individual thresholds for disseminating falsehoods.
C. Social Network Platforms and Dissemination of Rumors: Strength of
Ties, Thresholds, and “Bottom-up” Influence on Social Dynamics
More than twenty years ago, sociologists Gustavo Mesch and Ilan
Talmud mapped three social factors affecting the quality of online
ties: (1) social similarity (homophily); (2) the intensity of contact
(relationship duration); and (3) different dimensions of the rela86
tionship (multiplexity). An application of these factors to social

81. David Krackhardt, The Strength of Strong Ties: The Importance of Philos in Organizations,
in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM AND ACTION 216, 218 (N. Nohria &
Robert G. Eccles eds., 1992) (“Strong ties constitute a base of trust that can reduce resistance and provide comfort in the face of uncertainty.”).
82. See Lavi, supra note 53, at 17; cf. Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1290 (1987); Mark Granovetter &
Roland Soong, Threshold Models of Diffusion and Collective Behavior, 9 J. MATH. SOC. 165, 165–
66 (1983) (focusing on the homogeneity assumption in models where the network is composed of homogenous individuals).
83. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
956 (2005) (“Information transmitted via strong ties generally spreads less quickly, but is
more accurate and credible.”).
84. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 21–22 (explaining how a mixture
of strong and weak ties impacts the diffusion of protest movements)
85. Granovetter, A Network Theory Revisited, supra note 80, at 218–19; Strahilevitz, supra
note 83, at 965; Krackhardt, supra note 81, at 218; KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 69;.
86. Gustavo S. Mesch & Ilan Talmud, The Quality of Online and Offline Relationships: The
Roles of Multiplexity and Duration of Social Relationships, 22 INFO. SOC’Y 137 (2006).
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network platforms reveals that these platforms facilitate the formation of strong ties.
Social network platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, are
“web-based services that allow individuals to: (1) construct a public
or semi-public profile within a bounded system; (2) articulate a list
of other users with whom they share a connection; and (3) view
and traverse their list of connections and those made by others
87
within the system.” The design and interfaces of the network have
significant implications on the types of interactions. 88 The design
allows people to cluster around similar users who share a common
denominator and, thus, participants are relatively homogenous
within clusters. Moreover, social network platforms allow continuing interactions among repeat players, each of whom has a person89
al profile that represents their real identity in the physical world.
Finally, people discuss diversified and personal subjects on social
network platforms. Thus, strong ties are likely to form among participants of social network platforms, in contrast to other types of
90
platforms, and these ties have an extensive “bottom-up” effect on
the flow of information.
Strong social ties influence a recipient’s perception of speech.
Information transmitted via strong ties may be complex, personal,
91
and perceived as more credible. Due to the likelihood of strong
ties on social network platforms, the harm to reputation and public
interest in this setting can be extensive. First, in most social networks, speech is not anonymous. The personal profile a user creates within the system usually represents his real identity. The
source of the message is known and, thus, the message is perceived
as more credible than if it were to come from an anonymous
92
source. Second, social similarity and homogeneity on social net-

87. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2009) (citing
Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMMC’N 210, 211 (2008)).
88. See IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD
GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 118–19 (2013); Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1143.
89. Cf. Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1198 (explaining that Facebook has discretion
to remove users who do not use their real identity).
90. On social networks, strong ties are likely to form due to overlapping social circles
and similarity among users who cluster around one another, continuous two-way interaction
between repeat players, and various complex subjects of discussion. See Lavi, supra note 54,
at 903. Strong ties are less likely to form on other types of platforms. Id. at 893–94. Drawing
on network theory, especially the key factors affecting the quality of social ties, I outlined a
descriptive taxonomy of online platforms. I identified three categories of platforms based on
the strength of ties formed between their users: (1) freestyle discourse; (2) peer-production
and (3) deliberation and structuring communities (including social networks). Id. at 895–
908.
91. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 890–91.
92. Id. at 893–94; Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1198.
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works may lead to interdependence among participants, and
94
their social network influences their decisions. Clusters of strong
ties can create echo chambers where similar individuals support
and echo information, confirming prior convictions and entrench95
ing their credibility, while voiding other viewpoints. Such “bottom-up” influence of strong ties on social dynamics increases the
likelihood that members will reach their thresholds for accepting
96
and spreading information. Third, users may add comments to
the shared content, thereby validating and reinforcing it. Thus, the
process of social sharing has “bottom-up” influences that amplify
97
the gravity of harm.
On social network platforms, content can spread by word-ofmouth among actors who know each other, interact, or have mu98
99
tual interests. It can also spread by imitation via “memes” or in100
formation cascades. When many people simultaneously forward a
specific item of information over a short period of time and it
spreads beyond their own social network, the content becomes vi101
ral.
Further, a message shared through social networks may be more
102
influential than a message shared by mass media. For example,
103
“friends” on social networks generate similar types of content.

93. See Granovetter & Soong, supra note 82 (referring to the homogeneity assumption).
94. James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Dynamic Spread of Happiness in a Large Social Network: Longitudinal Analysis Over 20 Years in the Framingham Heart Study, 337 BMJ a2338
(2008); Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370–79 (2007).
95. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA,
11, 116–135, 155 (2017); see also BENKLER ET AL. supra note 2, at 80–83 (expanding on the
confirmation bias in the right wing media outlet that affected the dissemination of fake news
in the 2016 U.S. election campaign).
96. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 20 (noting that with the shared view of a few people,
they might come to accept the rumor).
97. Id. at 40; CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: CONSPIRACY THEORIES 85 (2015).
98. See KARINE NAHON & JEFF HEMSLEY, GOING VIRAL 36 (2013).
99. See AN XIAO MINA, MEMES TO MOVEMENTS HOW THE WORLD’S MOST VIRAL MEDIA IS
CHANGING SOCIAL PROTEST AND POWER 6, 20 (2019); LIMOR SHIFMAN, MEMES IN DIGITAL
CULTURE 2, 9–15 (2013) (explaining how the term “meme” was coined by Richard Dawkins
in 1976 to describe small units of culture that spread from person to person through copying or imitation; internet memes are posts in which shared norms and values are constructed through cultural artifacts) (referring to RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976)).
100. NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 38–39; see also Burt, supra note 82, at 1290 (referring to imitation and stickiness that increase the likelihood of diffusing information).
101. NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 16.
102. See ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE: THE PART PLAYED BY
PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATION 32 (1955) (explaining that most people express their opinions under the influence of central hubs in their social networks (the “opinion leaders”)).
103. In a scientific experiment, “Facebook showed some users fewer of their friends’
posts containing emotional language [and] then analyzed the users’ own posts to see
whether their emotional language changed.” James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of
Experiments on Social Media Users, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 219, 222 (2015) (citing Adam D.I.
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The strength of ties and context formed on social network platforms allows “top-down” social dynamics that enhance social pres104
sures. It also increases the likelihood that multiple users will
reach their threshold for accepting and disseminating speech
through their social ties. Thus, even neutral individuals who do not
have a prior disposition to support information may adopt and
spread a rumor. Moreover, even skeptics, who see that other individuals in their social network have disseminated a rumor, may
eventually reach their threshold for adopting and disseminating
105
it. Due to the strong ties on social networks, the likelihood for
106
correcting false rumors, defamation, and fake news decreases.
Indeed, not all ties in a social setting are strong, and alongside
strong ties, there are weak ties. These weak ties create a bridge between structural holes in the network and allow for vast dissemination. As a result, in online social networks, information is perceived
as credible because of the strong ties and may travel between distant parts of the social network, disseminating vastly over a short
period of time due to weak ties that bridge between non107
overlapping clusters of strong ties. Thus, weak ties accelerate the
dissemination of information beyond clusters of strong ties, whereas strong ties enhance the credibility of information.
D. The “Top-down” Influence of Online Intermediaries on Networks and
Thresholds
The social dynamics of content dissemination are not the whole
story. In addition to “bottom-up” dynamics, intermediaries of social
network platforms influence users from the “top-down,” causing
108
users to cross their thresholds and disseminate ideas.
Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S.A. 8788, 8788
(2014)). A change was indeed found. Id.
104. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO
MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 85–86 (2014).
105. NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 33 (explaining that the effects of the social
network enhance the dissemination of information).
106. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 918; SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 97, at 25–27 (explaining that in some cases efforts to correct a false rumor or conspiracy theory can have the opposite effect and even cause more people to believe it).
107. See KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 69 (explaining that since weak ties form among acquaintances, they facilitate the dissemination of information beyond the cluster of strong
ties).
108. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING DIGITAL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 170–74 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1456 (2011);
see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 60 (2015); James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE
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Individuals operate in a social context, and their behavior depends on the architecture of their environment. The technological
109
design of platforms has political dimensions. Values can be
“baked into” the technological architecture, offering a “seductively
110
elegant and effective means of control.” Each and every choice of
architecture affects the social network’s context and interpersonal
111
dynamics between users. Intermediaries can influence decisions
to generate and disseminate content through their choice of archi112
tecture. Such a choice also creates “affordances”—the possible
actions and uses that can be performed on the platform. These af113
fordances, in turn, influence how people use the platform. Just a
few tweaks in the design of an intermediary’s platform can make a
huge difference in how it is used and, consequently, its potential
for the widespread circulation of ideas. Understanding social dynamics on social networks allows intermediaries to harness technology and design their platform to influence the flow of information from the top down.
Intermediaries earn more revenue from advertisers as participation increases, since social engagement keeps users on the platform longer. Continued participation allows intermediaries to col114
lect more information on users, monetize “social graph,” target
115
personalized advertisements, and maximize profits. Therefore,
J.L. & TECH. 42, 55 (2015) (expanding on governing mechanisms that structure participation in a community to facilitate cooperation).
109. See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980) (discussing in detail the political dimensions of technological design).
110. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2019)
(“[D]esign’s awesome yet invisible capacity to manipulate those who exist inside its ecosystem requires us to consider the values we want design to promote.”); Deirdre K. Mulligan &
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-By-Design, 106 CAL. L. REV. 697, 701, 721 (2018);
see also Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 N.C. L. REV.
1257, 1299 (2018) (discussing the value in body cameras that track police officers’ behavior).
111. See NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 82 (explaining that Twitter limits the number of characters in tweets. The platform was intentionally structured this way by its designers. Consequently, people use it for short reports on what they are doing); TUFECKI,
TWITTER AND TEARGAS, supra note 33, at 267 (noting the possibilities for technology to shape
and influence the dissemination of rumors).
112. See Lavi, supra note 53, at 14. Technology plays an important role in influencing
contexts. See, e.g., NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 82. (giving an example of how character limitations influence the flow of information). See generally B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE
TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE THINK AND DO 5 (2003).
113. RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 46, at 65; Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913 (2013) (“[O]ur artifacts organize the world for us, subtly shaping
the ways that we make sense of it.”)
114. COHEN, supra note 73, at 65, 83 (“Platform-based, massively intermediated environments enable people seeking connection with each other to signal their affinities and
inclinations using forms of shorthand—‘Like’, ‘Follow,’ ‘Retweet,’ and so on—that simultaneously enable data capture and extraction.”).
115. Id. at 55; MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 171 (2019) (“The
more content users voluntarily provide (posts, shares, likes etc.), the more users interact on
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intermediaries strive to maximize the participation of users and so116
cial sharing. To accomplish this, they use insights gleaned from
117
sociology, psychology, and management. “These insights allow
intermediaries to predict cognitive biases and social dynamics, deploy new socio-technical systems, and influence flows of infor118
119
mation.” Such influences are operating from the top down.
Similar to the gaming industry, design and technology can turn the
120
use of social media addictive.
For example, social network intermediaries bolster user motivation to spread content, make it easier for them to share infor121
mation, and trigger them to do so. They excel in making users
feel socially connected. Pictures, names, and other informal signs
122
create the feeling that mere contacts are close friends. Moreover,
intermediaries frequently “utilize algorithms to prioritize newsfeed
content created by a user’s close friends and family, which rein-

the platform, and the more companies like Facebook can target users with increasingly personal advertising. If harmful content provided by a user generates a high level of engagement from a large number of users, then the advertising benefit of that post goes up, which
means more money in Facebook’s pocket.”); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019)
(coining the term “surveillance capitalism” to describe tracking users’ engagements in order
to enhance commercial profits); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data,
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1555 (2018);
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet as It Is (and as
It Should Be), 118 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1085–86 (2020) (reviewing NICK DRNASO, SABRINA
(2018)).
116. See MARANTZ, supra note 39, at 80 (“Facebook’s larger goal, which always went unstated, was not to spread high-quality content; it was to entice more users into spending
more time on Facebook.”); JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING
INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 72, 102 (2012); ARI EZRA WALDMAN,
PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 90 (2018); Julie E Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 140 (2017); Daniel J. Solove, The
Myth of the Privacy Paradox 14 (George Wash. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-10,
2020). See generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD FROM EDISON TO
GOOGLE 154–57 (2009) (discussing the development of intermediary dynamics across various industries).
117. Lavi, supra note 53, at 12.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 12, 18–19.
120. ZUBOFF, supra note 115, at 466 (“[J]ust as ordinary consumers can become compulsive gamblers at the hands of gaming industry, behavioral technology draws ordinary young
people into an unprecedented vortex of social information . . . .”); see also Karen Mettler, A
Lawmaker Wants to End ‘Social Media Addiction’ by Killing Features that Enable Mindless Scrolling,
WASH. POST (July 30, 2019), wapo.st/2KBQ3X5; WOODROW HARTZOG: PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT:
THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 198 (2018) (expanding on
architecture that makes the platform sticky and causes users to become addicted to the engagement);
121. See HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 197; JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING
YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW 18 (2018). See generally FOGG, supra note 112, at
198 (referring to socio-technical tools for enhancing users’ motivation and ability to spread
content, which intermediaries use to trigger users to spread information).
122. Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1162–63.
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forces existing biases and further encourages dissemination.”
Consequently, users share content they would not have necessarily
124
shared offline. This choice in architecture frames relationships
and increases the likelihood that an individual will reach his
125
threshold for accepting and spreading content. It should also be
noted that intermediaries can influence the content of information that users share, as the Cambridge Analytica scandal has
126
demonstrated. This Part, however, will focus on the influence intermediaries have on user decisions to share more information, regardless of its content or topic.
Intermediaries on social network platforms allow users to create
personal profiles and declare that other users are their “friends.”
This framing of relationships enhances social trust and motivates
users to divulge and share personal information. Defining every
connection as a “friend” increases the likelihood of reaching the
threshold to adopt and disseminate information, even though not
all connections are actually their friends in the traditional sense of
127
the word.
Another example of how architecture choices can impact dissemination is social mirroring. This strategy reflects a user’s behavior back to them via their newsfeed, leading to implied feedback
128
and enforcing group identity. Social mirroring enhances the

123. Lavi, supra note 53, at 30 n.213 (citing SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 16). In a related
context Sacha Baron-Cohen demonstrated how the algorithmic code and algorithmic recommendations it targets encourages users to share specific types of content. See Sacha Baron
Cohen, Read Sacha Baron Cohen’s Scathing Attack on Facebook in Full: ‘Greatest Propaganda Machine in History,’ THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2019/nov/22/sacha-baron-cohen-facebook-propaganda [https://perma.cc/7YPM-R8C7].
124. See Lavi, supra note 53, at 6 n.14; Samantha L. Miller, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 546 (2008); cf. NICHOLAS
CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 179–82 (2014) (explaining the psychological
impacts of techniques used by technology companies to facilitate bonds with their users).
125. See James Grimmelmann, Accidental Privacy Spills, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2008); Daniel Solove, Introduction: Privacy, Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1880, 1886–88 (2013).
126. See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; Sam Meredith, Here’s Everything You Need to
Know About the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, CNBC (Mar. 23, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-cambridge-analytica-scandal-everything-you-need-to-know
.html.
127. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 19, 221–22 (2016); see also BERNARD E HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 86, 99–100 (2015); Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, WASH. U. L. REV.
1535, 1565–66 (2019); Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox,” CURRENT ISSUES PSYCH. (forthcoming, 2020).
128. See Meng Ma & Ritu Agarwal, Through a Glass Darkly: Information Technology Design,
Identity Verification, and Knowledge Contribution in Online Communities, 18 INFO. SYS. RES. 42, 58
(2007); cf. Joan Morris DiMocco, Anna Pandolfo & Walter Bender, Influencing Group Participation with a Shared Display, 6 PROC. A.C.M. CONF. ON COMPUT. SUPPORTED COOP. WORK 614,
619 (2004) (discussing the results of experiments into the impacts of group dynamics on
social processes).
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network’s influence on the individual user and increases the user’s
likelihood of reaching the threshold to join his “friends” and dis129
seminate a rumor. The power of social mirroring has been proven in an experiment conducted by Facebook. The social network
only displayed the negative posts of “friends,” omitting positive
ones. As a result, users created and shared negative posts at higher
130
rates than other types of content.
Intermediaries selectively influence the content users see in
their newsfeed and content is not always presented chronologically. Intermediaries can use Artificial Intelligence algorithms to tailor
a users’ newsfeed to present relevant content and prioritize the
131
content of close friends and family. This strategy increases the
visibility of such content and the motivation to spread the information, because it increases confirmation bias among homoge132
nous participants and enforces their beliefs.
Intermediaries also allow explicit feedback by facilitating mech133
anisms for voting and the formation of reputations. These mechanisms bolster mutual influence within the social network and pave
134
the way for extensive dissemination of ideas within the network.
129. See ZUBOFF, supra note 115, at 21, 306 (addressing social pressures and architecture
that replace politics and democracy (confluence) and describing how social networks create
context and influence the engagement of individuals); Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John &
George Loewenstein, The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 49 J. MKTG.
RSCH. 160, 162 (2012).
130. BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 117–18 (2008)
(describing Facebook’s cognition experiment, testing users’ emotions).
131. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 14 (“ ‘[T]he goal of [the] News Feed is to show people
the stories that are most relevant to them.’ With that point in mind, why does Facebook rank
stories in its News Feed? ‘So that people can see what they care about first, and don’t miss
important stuff from their friends.’ ”); see also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA:
HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 77–105 (2018).
132. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 122–24; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 76 (“[Individuals] look for media outlets and politicians that will inform them as best as possible without
suffering too much cognitive discomfort.”); see also Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the
Practical Inevitability of Law, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 88 (2019) (“Algorithmic processes
optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt social sharing heighten the volatility of
online interactions, and surveillant assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content targeting and behavioral marketing create powerful — and easily weaponized — stimulus-response feedback loops.”). See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE
INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 35–48 (2011) (providing one of the first warnings that algorithms show links that users are more likely to click on).
133. For example, the “like” button on Facebook.
134. See COHEN, supra note 73, at 85 (“[S]ocial networking as Facebook and microblogging platforms, such as Twitter function as de facto aggregators for a wide range of content
and deliver feeds optimized to everything that is known or inferred about particular users’
opinions and beliefs. By design, all of those algorithms incorporate feedback effects, and so
their operation both reflects and continually reinforces the powerful economic motivation
to pursue viral spread.”); BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT 80–82 (2009); FOGG,
supra note 112, at 44; Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and
Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. & SCI. 1407, 1418 (2003) (discussing studies on the impacts of online feedback loops on establishing linkages between disconnected
networks).
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Intermediaries can also function as social actors and reward users
for certain kinds of activity. 135 For example, Twitter used to reply
automatically to every user who re-tweets and disseminates content
with the message: “very nice.” The ability of intermediaries to function as social actors has expanded with the development of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning algorithms that allow the
operation of social bots. Such algorithmic software programs that
operate according to intermerdiaries’ instructions can interact socially with users, enhance their trust in the communication of the
136
intermediary, and increase the likelihood of disseminating ideas.
Intermediaries not only enhance the motivation to disseminate
content but also simplify the ability to do so. For example, “forward,” “share,” or “re-tweet” buttons facilitate quick dissemination
at the click of a button. There is no need for users to undergo the
cumbersome copy and paste process in order to spread content.
Due to the low cost of sharing and disseminating information, it is
more likely that individuals will cross their “threshold” and join in137
dividuals already engaged in dissemination of information. Simplifying dissemination encourages users to share information intui138
tively and almost automatically, bypassing reflective thinking
139
about the consequences of dissemination. This choice of architecture engineers social behavior and influences decision-making,
by promoting the fast dissemination of information to a wide audi140
ence.

135. See B.J. Fogg & Clifford Nass, Silicon Sycophants: The Effects of Computers That Flatter, 46
INT’L J. HUM. COMPUT. STUDS. 551, 559–60 (1997) (discussing intermediaries as social actors
and persuasive socio-technical tools).
136. See Emilio Ferrara, Onur Varol, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer & Alessandro
Flammini, The Rise of Social Bots, 59 COMMC’NS A.C.M. 96, 96 (2016) (“A social bot is a computer algorithm that automatically produces content and interacts with humans on social
media, trying to emulate and possibly alter their behavior.”); WALDMAN, supra note 116, at
141 (expanding on the social communication of bots that motivate people to waive privacy
protections, as a result of technological design); JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR
DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW 55–58 (2018) (“If your extended peer
group contains a lot of fake people, calculated to manipulate you, you are likely be influenced without even realizing it.”).
137. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 108.
138. Julie E. Cohen, Tailoring Election Regulation: The Platform Is the Frame, 4 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 8) (explaining that platform-based, massively intermediated information environments are not designed for eliciting automatic, precognitive interactions with online content and discussing the aspects of platform interfaces that
are designed for automatic, habitual engagement).
139. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 237 (2011) (explaining two systems of thinking: intuitive thinking, “system 1,” and deliberative analytic thinking, “system
2”).
140. FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 130, at 235 (“The smart social media environment that has emerged in the past decade of which Facebook is an important part – encourages people to accept what is presented to them without pushing for reflection or deliberation.”).
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This Section focused on the intermediaries’ top-down influence
on engagement and dissemination of any type of content. Beyond
141
the focus of this Article, it should be noted that intermediaries
can prioritize false information on users’ newsfeeds because such
142
content inspires surprise and enhances engagement. In short,
social dynamics influence content dissemination from the bottom
up and social network platform intermediaries enhance dissemination from the top down, both pushing users past their thresholds
for dissemination of information. Although it is difficult to predict
exactly when ideas will spread widely, both the strength of ties on
social networks and the intermediary’s choice architecture make it
more likely that rumors will spread on online social network platforms than on other types of platforms.
E. Publish, Share, Re-tweet, and Repeat: Benefits and Challenges
Sharing content online can have a snowball effect and compound dissemination. As content gains more attention, users as143
cribe more weight to it. Information disseminated can include
harmful content, false rumors, defamation, and fake news, all inflicting tremendous harm. Despite this, the dissemination of information online can afford many benefits.
First, the sharing of information online promotes freedom of
144
speech and the rationales at the base of this constitutional right.
It promotes individual autonomy and approval for the speaker’s

141. For a discussion about the dangerous results of algorithmic recommendations involving harmful content, see Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477,
500–05 (2020). In a related context, algorithmic impact assessment was proposed to accommodate the problem of discrimination and other harmful effects of algorithmic biases.
For an expansion on the topic, see Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th
Cong. (2019). For further discussion and criticism on the proposed bill, see Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, Opinion, The Legislation That Targets the Racist Impacts of Tech,
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/tech-racismalgorithms.html [https://perma.cc/F4FL-7BMA].
142. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 131, at 5–6; see also Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 VA. L. REV. 867, 894 (2020); Mark Bergen, YouTube Executives Ignored Warnings,
Letting Toxic Videos Run Rampant, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/features/2019-04-02/youtube-executives-ignored-warnings-letting-toxic-videos-runrampant [https://perma.cc/LU9A-SW5N]; Cohen, supra note 132 (describing intermediaries as “the greatest propaganda machine in history”).
143. The more times individuals are exposed to information, the more they tend to believe it. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 21 (“[R]umors frequently spread through information cascades. The basic dynamic behind such cascades is simple: once a certain number
of people appear to believe a rumor, others will believe it to, unless they have good reason
to believe it is false.”); DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 47, at 225, Lavi, supra note 53, at 20.
144. Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for
the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004); Lavi, supra note 25, at 179; Lavi, supra
note 54, at 879.
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145
way of life. It also promotes a vibrant marketplace of ideas as it enhances content accessibility and the right to receive information. 146
Dissemination also promotes democracy because it helps to keep citizens informed about acts of government and guarantees that poli147
cy is reached intelligently, as almost every member of Congress
148
operates a social media account. Copying and disseminating content “promotes democracy by literally putting information in citi149
zens’ hands.” It also enhances civic involvement and collective
150
action to promote important social and political goals, even ena151
bling protest. In addition, dissemination protects a participatory
democratic culture by enhancing dialogue on information from a
152
broader variety of sources and allowing all members a fair chance
to develop and share ideas within the communities to which they
153
belong.
Second, dissemination of content encourages novel ways of con154
suming, transacting, and making a living. It promotes efficiency
by reducing the cost of information searches and increasing the

145. See Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303,
313–16 (1991) (focusing on the importance of free speech in promoting individual autonomy).
146. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5–9 (1869) (the search for truth ensures that
every expression enters the marketplace of ideas); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH
FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1958). The search for truth theory was popularized by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919), in which he stated that “the best test for truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” See Sanchez, supra note 24, at
314–16.
147. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26 (1948) (discussing the rationale for promoting democracy).
148. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1725–36 (2017) (“On Facebook,
for example, users can debate religion and politics with their friends and neighbors or share
vacation photos. On LinkedIn, users can look for work, advertise for employees, or review
tips on entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users can petition their elected representatives
and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner. Indeed, Governors in all 50 States and
almost every Member of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose.”).
149. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565 (2004) (on the importance of copying and republishing expressions in maintaining democracy in the related context of copyright).
150. For instance, the dissemination of content allows unconnected individuals to organize and promote important goals such as attending the funeral of a lone soldier or efficiently organizing a civil protest. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF
ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATION 146–64 (2008); CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS:
CREATIVITY AND GENEROSITY IN A CONNECTED AGE 175 (2010).
151. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 264.
152. Sanchez, supra note 24, at 316–17; see also Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59, 71 (Lucie M. C. R. Guibault
& P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
153. Balkin, supra note 144, at 3–4 (explaining that an individual’s ability to participate
in the production and distribution of culture promotes freedom of speech).
154. See Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J.
ENV’T L. & LITIG. 1, 4–5 (2012).
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accessibility of information about businesses, services, or commodities. This kind of information can help assess reputations and facilitate beneficial transactions, thereby minimizing inefficient services
155
and streamlining markets.
Third, dissemination of content promotes innovation, which is
cumulative by nature, with most inventors building upon the work
of their predecessors. Knowledge produces ideas that can be com156
bined and recombined over and over again. The free flow of information thus fosters the discussion of valuable ideas, promoting
incremental innovation and enriching culture.
Fourth, dissemination of content allows the condemnation of
immoral behavior, promotes desirable social norms and expands
157
the scope of traditional shaming. Today, “we live in a virtual
‘global village’ and events occurring across the world simultane158
ously occur in our living rooms.” This allows the public to express disapproval of individuals who violate social norms, empowering people to implement shaming sanctions and enforce social
159
norms, which would otherwise go unenforced. When the content

155. On the benefits of information flow between customers in promoting transparency
in digital markets and improving various aspects of the standard form contract, see Shmuel
I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 314 (2008) (“Consumers advised of biased
terms might refrain from contracting with specific vendors, should such contracting lead to
inefficient outcomes. This information flow would stop vendors from including biased and
unfair provisions in their SFCs to begin with, to avoid the loss of consumers.”); Shmuel I.
Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Online Consumer Contracts: No One Reads but Does Anyone Care, 12
JERUSALEM REV. L. STUDS. 105, 109 (2015) (giving an example of information on mandatory
arbitration clauses in online terms that “further circulated and, as a result, the firm’s reputation seemed to be coming under attack”).
156. See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK,
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 82 (2014) (“[K]nowledge
itself increases over time as previous seed ideas are recombined into new ones. This is an
innovative-as-building-block view of the world . . . .”). There is a virtually infinite number of
potentially valuable reconfigurations of existing pieces of knowledge. On the cumulative
nature of most innovation, see White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515
(9th Cir. 1993): “All creators draw in part on the work of those who came before, referring
to it, building on it, poking fun at it, we call this creativity, not piracy.”
157. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 611
(1996) (referring to the development of the shaming sanction in its early days and analyzing
social condemnation through shaming as a valid form of criminal sanction). It is worth noting that several years later, Kahan acknowledged the shortcomings of shaming. See Dan M.
Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075 (2005). Accordingly,
everyone has different values and there remains ambiguity regarding the scope of immoral
behavior that should be punished by shaming.
158. Lauren M. Goldman, Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites in Public Shaming
Punishments, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415, 443 n.237 (quoting Deni Smith Garcia, Three Worlds
Collide: A Novel Approach to the Law, Literature, and Psychology of Shame, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 105, 111 (1999)).
159. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2601–02; Goldman, supra note 158, at 450 (2015) (“[T]he
inclusion of online social media websites in public shaming sanctions may prove to be an
effective form of punishment that takes into account the societal conditions that exist today.”). An example of condemnation by shaming is a video recording a person’s ugly behav-
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disseminated is true and the dissemination does not violate the
160
161
162
law, sharing has many virtues that may outweigh its vices.
The conclusion may be different when the content disseminated
includes falsehoods, defamation, fake news, or other information
163
that causes harm without legitimate purpose. In such cases,
harmful information can spread rapidly, causing severe, unjustified
reputational harm and even infringing on public interest. This can
occur even when the original expression published is true if, during the process of dissemination, users add falsehoods to the original statement or cite the information and repeat it out of its origi164
nal context. Thus, even if the original expression reflects the
truth, the process of dissemination can change the way the information is interpreted and increase misinformation, disinfor165
mation, and defamation.
Individuals generally ascribe greater credibility to negative con166
tent than to other types of content. This result is due to “negativity bias” and the strength of bad events, information, or feedback
ior. As the video is shared via social networks and goes viral, that individual is punished by
being shamed. See also, e.g., JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED ch. 1 (2015)
(describing shaming that led to removal of a fake Twitter profile which hijacked a person’s
identity); Amit Cotler, The Ugliest Kind of Israeli: Passengers Hurl Abuse at Flight Attendant, YNET
ISRAEL NEWS (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4629380,00.html
[https://perma.cc/B8XY-RTN7].
160. Dissemination of certain types of content is illegal. For example, many states, and
even other countries, criminalize the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography. See
Mary Anne Frank, Revenge Porn Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1256
(2017) (referring to state laws and the process of federal legislation in the United States);
James Vincent, Sharing Revenge Porn in the UK Now Carries a Two-Year Jail Sentence, THE VERGE
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/4/13/8398691/revenge-porn-laws-uk-jailtime.
161. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 92–94 (2007). In a world of increasingly rude and uncivil behavior, shaming
helps society maintain a norm of civility and etiquette. Online shaming also gives people the
chance to fight back, voice their disapproval of inappropriate behavior and even poor customer service. This kind of shaming allows the little guy to fight back against big corporations and also provides valuable information to help us assess another’s reputation. Moreover, without the sanction of shaming, people would be able to continue rude and wrongful
behavior without repercussion.
162. It should be noted that although Internet shaming has many benefits, it can also
lead to some serious problems. For example, internet shaming is hard to control, can be
disproportional, lacks due process and may lead to bullying. See SOLOVE, supra note 161, at
94–98; Lavi, supra note 32, at 2621.
163. See generally Danielle K. Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1908–24, 1929
(2019) (discussing the dissemination of intimate photos without consent and explains that
current legal practices are ill equipped to accommodate the problem of abuses of digital
dissemination).
164. Even dissemination of true information can develop into defamation when the disseminators combine new additions and headlines to the post and remove it from its original
context. See Lavi, supra note 25, at 199–200; Lavi, supra note 32, at 2607 n.30.
165. MINA, supra note 99, at 148–50 (explaining that shared posts that spread norms and
values (memes), can develop different interpretations and narratives and increase disinformation).
166. Lavi supra note 25, at 152.
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167

compared to good events. As a result, negative ideas receive
more weight than other types of expression. Moreover, falsehoods
tend to provoke and activate emotions and thereby be disseminat168
ed “farther, faster, deeper, and broader” than true statements.
Therefore, negative, defamatory content is likely to outweigh efforts by other social media users to counter it and continue to
169
spread rapidly, ruining reputations.
Alongside reputational harm, dissemination of defamatory remarks infringes on the same values that sharing strives to promote:
freedom of expression, efficiency, innovation, and enforcement of
norms.
First, the dissemination of falsehoods infringes upon the victim’s
170
171
free speech. Due to the “negativity bias” and “the weight as172
cribed to repeated content,” diffusion of negative falsehoods
173
“may lead to self-exclusion” and “deny victims the ability to engage with others as equals, which might suppress a free public de174
bate,” harm the victim’s autonomy, and hinder the free market
175
of ideas and public participation. Moreover, due to the technological and social context that allows the spread of falsehoods at
the click of a button and bypasses deliberative thinking, dissemination may infringe on the disseminator’s autonomy and free will.

167. Id.; Roy Baumeister, Ellen Bartslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer & Kathleen D. Vohs, Bad
Is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 323, 346 (2001); see also Elizabeth A. Kensinger,
Negative Emotion Enhances Memory Accuracy: Behavioral and Neuroimaging Evidence, 16 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 213, 213 (2007) (“[N]egative emotion enhances not only the subjective vividness of a memory but also the likelihood of remembering some (but not all) event
details.”).
168. Vosoughi et al., supra note 15, at 1147; see also Jonah Berger & Katherine L. Milkman, What Makes Online Content Viral?, 49 J. MKTG. RSCH. 192, 197 (2012).
169. Lavi supra note 25, at 152.
170. See Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, KNIGHT FIRST
AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-toregulate-and-not-regulate-social-media (explaining that the values that free speech is designed to serve are at risk).
171. See Baumeister et al., supra note 167, at 346.
172. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 47, at 225 (discussing the weight ascribed to repeated hearsay).
173. Lavi, supra note 25, at 182.
174. Lavi, supra note 53, at 53; see also Balkin, supra note 170 (“[A]ntagonistic sources of
information do not serve the values of free expression when people don’t trust anyone and
professional norms dissolve.”); CITRON, supra note 46, at 47–49 (referring to the potential of
falsehoods to exclude individuals from public debate); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin
Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 401, 420 (2017) (“Individuals have difficulty expressing themselves in the face of online
assaults.”); Citron, supra note 115, at 1083. (“Online falsehoods, privacy invasions, and
threats imperil targeted individuals’ life opportunities, including their ability to express
themselves.”).
175. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1994 (2018) (“[A]rguments involving speech on both sides focus on
the degree to which one party’s expressive activity compromises the ability of other private
parties to exercise their own First Amendment rights.”).
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This is because the technological context might manipulate individuals to disseminate falsehoods without consideration, which
176
they might regret at a later stage.
In addition, spreading falsehoods within online social networks
can distort the marketplace of ideas and the public interests of
truth and democracy. Due to the technological context that allows
sharing at the click of a button and the social context that facilitates information and reputation cascades, negative falsehoods can
spread widely and users are more likely to perceive them as credible. The wide dissemination of falsehoods, defamation, and fake
177
news erodes the truth and distorts the marketplace of ideas. The
socio-technological context of dissemination might not allow equal
178
access to both “wise” and “unwise” ideas. Falsehoods will spread
farther than the truth, leading to an erosion of democracy and in179
fringement of public interest.
Second, beyond the infringement of free speech, spreading defamation and negative falsehoods about individuals injures their
reputation, which is the basis for inclusion in market transactions.
Thus, it may lead recipients to mistakenly avoid efficient transactions with individuals due to unchecked false information on them.
As individuals are free to form contracts, can choose the people
they contract with, and can avoid contracting with others, they are
likely to avoid forming contracts with people who have had negative information disseminated about them, even if the information
180
is false. Third, the unjustified exclusion of individuals from markets may also hinder the development of new products and services. Fourth, due to negativity bias and the power of repetition,
176. See Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Pedro Giovanni
Leon, Gregory Norcie & Yang Wang, I Regretted the Minute I Pressed Share: A Qualitative Study of
Regrets on Facebook, PROC. A.C.M. SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY, July 20-22, 2011, at
§ 4.3; Yang Wang, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Xiaoxuan Chen & Saranga Komanduri, From Facebook Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1320–23 (2013).
177. FRANKS, supra note 115, at 119 (“[E]ven if people had strong preferences for the
truth, there is no reason for confidence that the marketplace would help them discover it.”);
Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 894 (2019) (“[D]eliberately deceptive speech undermines, not
enhances, the pursuit of truth.”); see also Jonathan D. Varat, Truth, Courage, and Other Human
Dispositions: Reflections on Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 48–49
(2018); Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY,
SPEECH AND REPUTATION 91, 102 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nusbaum eds., 2010).
178. Cf. Dan Laidman, When the Slander Is the Story: The Neutral Reportage Privilege in Theory
and Practice, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 74, 99 (2010); Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No
Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM.
L.J. 55, 69 (2018); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 406 (“[T]he marketplace of ideas can fail, ensuring that false statements will spread and become entrenched.”).
179. See Hasen, supra note 12, at 544; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 394 (“[I]f people spread
false statements—most obviously about public officials and institutions—democracy itself
will suffer.”)
180. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 266–67 (8th ed. 2011).
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dissemination of defamation validates falsehoods and develops undesirable social perceptions.
In sum, dissemination of content has many benefits. It promotes
values of free expression, efficiency, innovation, and the enforcement of desirable social norms. Yet, when the content disseminated is false and negative, the same values can be infringed and severe harm can be inflicted. The law should not stop the flow of
information and it must avoid a disproportionate “chilling effect”
on speech. Solutions, however, should be developed to mitigate
harm caused by the dissemination of falsehood. Protecting individual reputations and the public interest of access to the truth,
without curbing free speech, is one of the main challenges internet
regulation faces today.
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY OF INTERMEDIARIES
How does the law deal with dissemination of falsehoods on social network platforms? This Part provides a comparative overview
focusing on intermediary liability for defamation. 181 It continues
with a critical review of international policy models governing secondary liability of online intermediaries that facilitate the harmful
exchange of information.
A. United States
In the United States, freedom of speech has greater protection
than in other Western democracies: there is a presumption against
182
restrictions on speech. Section 230 of the CDA provides one of

181. This Part will focus on the intermediary and not on the liability of the publisher of
the harmful expression. The liability of the publisher can only be helpful in limited contexts, and cannot prevent the further spread of information, as the law immunizes online
republishers. The Article will not address the potential liability of individuals who share information since it is difficult and even impractical to hold them responsible and receive full
compensation for the aggregated reputational damage. Litigation can be cumbersome since
none of the repolishes that shared content is solely responsible for the damage and there is
a large number of defendants. For further information on this aspect of dissemination, see
Perry, supra note 26. This Part will also not address specific election campaign finance laws
that apply to publishers. For further information on this topic, see Hasen, supra note 12, at
554–63.
182. Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech From “Posts-as-Trumps” to Proportionality and
Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11–12); Oreste Pollicino
& Marco Bassini, Free Speech, Defamation and the Limits to Freedom of Expression in the EU: A Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 513–28 (Andrej Savin & Jan
Trzaskowski eds., 2014) (demonstrating that in the United States, there are stronger protections on the freedom of speech than in the EU, and that the different balance between values is even more prominent online). But see FRANKS, supra note 115 (arguing that legislators,
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the most important protections of freedom of expression in the
183
United States in the digital age. This federal legislation represents the mindset of internet exceptionalism, differentiating the
184
internet from the media before. It generally blocks lawsuits
against online intermediaries. Section 230(c)(1), under the subsection header “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and
Screening of Offensive Material,” directs that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 185 “Congress declared that online service
providers could never be treated as publishers for material they did
186
not develop.”
By declaring that online intermediaries cannot be treated as
publishers of content authored by others, the aim of Congress was
to promote self-regulation, freedom of expression, and support the
rise of lively internet enterprises.187 Under § 230(c)(1), online service providers, including website operators, are immune from pri188
mary and secondary liability for a wide variety of claims. This is
because an individual user who is considered “another information
189
content provider” published the original defamatory content. Intermediaries are not held responsible for that user’s conduct or for
republishing content. This applies even when the intermediary it-

courts and civil rights organizations have interpreted the First Amendment selectively, just
like religious fundamentalists, and in fact infringe on the rights of minorities and the underprivileged to free speech, shifting even more power from vulnerable populations to powerful ones).
183. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2313
(2014); see also Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2019).
184. KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 78.
185. Communication Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
186. Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 651 (2014). The
Protection for Good Samaritan subsection aims to promote self-regulation and encourage
intermediaries to screen offensive materials without bearing liability. See Citron & Wittes,
supra note 174, at 403; Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 253, 262–63 (2006).
187. For further information on the history and objectives of § 230, see JEFF KOSSEFF,
supra note 20, at 11–35 (2019); Chander, supra note 186, at 651–52; and Lavi, supra note 32,
at 2636.
188. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its plain
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service” (emphasis
added).); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that intermediaries are immune even if they pay third parties to write columns on their platforms,
which contain defamatory speech); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F. 3d
980, 984–86 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that intermediaries are immune even when they provide access to information from third parties and this information is erroneous).
189. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

WINTER 2021]

Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat

473

190

self republishes the user’s content. Courts have interpreted § 230
broadly and have also shielded intermediaries from liability as dis191
tributers of content. As a result, this section has “repeatedly
shielded web enterprises from lawsuits in a plethora of cases” when
they failed to remove harmful content, when they operated editorial discretion and discriminated content, and even when they per192
formed more active roles in dissemination of content. It should
be noted that this immunity is gradually eroding. First, intermediaries are only immune with regard to information that is “provided
193
by another content provider.” If a plaintiff can demonstrate that
the intermediary provided the content, the intermediary will not
benefit from § 230 immunity. Second, even if a third party is held
accountable for creating the content, § 230 only prevents the court
from treating the platform as “publisher or speaker.” If a plaintiff
can demonstrate that the lawsuit stemmed from an action by the
defendant that was not publishing or speaking, the court should
194
find that § 230 does not block the lawsuit.
190. Lavi, supra note 25; see also, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020, 1034 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that a moderator of a listserv and operator of a website who posted a defamatory e-mail authored by a third party may be exempt from liability if the material is “provided” by someone else); Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Opinion Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1311,
1318–20 (M.D. Fla. 2015). It is worth noting that § 230 also exempts internet users who
share content published by others. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 525, 528–29 (Cal.
2006) (“[C]ongressional purpose of fostering free speech on the Internet supports the extension of section 230 immunity to active individual ‘users.’ ”).
191. Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v.
America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 585–87 (2008); cf.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2).
192. Lavi, supra note 54, at 867–70; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“By its plain language,
§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”); Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009); Giordano v. Romeo
76 So. 3d 1100, 1101–02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp.
3d 1056, 1064–66 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that immunity applies even when the intermediary knew of the defamatory content and did not remove it), aff’d, No. 16-15610, 2017 WL
2445063 (9th Cir. June 6, 2017); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, No. 18-396, 2019 WL 1384092 (2d
Cir. Mar. 27, 2019); Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding
that activity of intermediaries to restrict materials is covered by § 230’s immunity as intermediaries are not state actors and are not subjected to the First Amendment); Fyk v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-16232, 2020 WL 3124258, at *1 (9th Cir. June 12, 2020) (noting that §
230 protects intermediaries’ editorial discretion to moderate content); Batzel, 333 F.3d at
1030–33 (holding that immunity applies even when an operator of a listserv repeated users’
content in a listserv).
193. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (referring to immunity for “any information provided by another information content provider”); KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 166.
194. KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 166; Lavi, supra note 32, 2659 n.251; see also Harrington v.
Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (D. Or. 2018) (noting that “because a local regulation
did not require the Platforms to monitor third-party content” or to remove it, it does not
treat them as publishers, and thus falls outside the preemptive scope of § 230); Eric Goldman, Racial Discrimination Lawsuit Against Airbnb Has the Potential to Change Online Marketplaces–Harrington v. Airbnb, TECH. & MKTG. LAWBLOG (Nov. 2, 2018) (explaining that although
the case does not discuss § 230, it offers a roadmap around it); Bolger v Amazon.com, Inc.,
53 Cal. App. 5th 431 (2020) (holding that Amazon is not immune from liability to market-

474

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:2

Section 230, however, recently sustained an attack regarding
immunity for user generated content. Recently, Twitter added a
fact checking label to tweets of the 45th President of the United
States, Donald Trump, stating that viewers could “get the facts” by
clicking on the addendum. 195 Following this labeling, President
Donald Trump attempted to curb the online platform’s protection
for “Good Samaritans.”
On May 28, 2020, Trump issued an executive order on “Preventing Online Censorship” pertaining to online platforms. 196 After a
policy statement on the need to “seek transparency and accountability from online platforms, and . . . preserve the integrity and
openness of American discourse and freedom of expression,” 197 the
order outlines a narrow interpretation to § 230. It clouds the legal
landscape for content moderation decisions, explaining that §
230(c)(2) applies only to “good faith” moderation decisions. 198 It,
thus, allows stripping the shield from moderation decisions that
the government does not see as moderation in “good faith.” The
order further directs “all executive departments and agencies” to
“ensure that their application of [S]ection 230(c) properly reflects
the narrow purpose of the section and take all appropriate actions
in this regard.” 199
In addition, the order directs each executive department and
agency to review media advertising spent on online platforms and
restrict platforms’ receipt of advertising dollars. 200 “The Department of Justice shall review in the viewpoint-based speech restrictions imposed by each online platform . . . and assess whether
any online platforms are problematic vehicles for government
speech due to viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers,
or other bad practices.” 201 The order further provides that the
White House “will submit” reports of purported “online censor197F

198F

19F

place items); Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2016) (alleging that the intermediary and its employees wrote the defamatory statements). For criticism of extending
§ 230 liability to other activities, see Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet
as a Speech Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Speech Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 45, 51–52.
195. See Makena Kelly, Twitter Labels Trump Tweets as ‘Potentially Misleading’ for the First
Time, THE VERGE (May 26, 2020, 6:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/26
/21271207/twitter-donald-trump-fact-check-mail-in-voting-coronavirus-pandemic-california.
196. Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020).
197. Id. § 1.
198. See id. § 2 (“[U]nder the law, this provision is not distorted to provide liability protection for online platforms that—far from acting in “good faith” to remove objectionable
content — instead engage in deceptive or pretextual actions (often contrary to their stated
terms of service) to stifle viewpoints with which they disagree.”).
199. Id. § 2(b).
200. Id. § 3.
201. Id. § 3(c).
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ship” received through its “Tech Bias Reporting Tool” to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).202
The latter can “consider taking action” under applicable law, including under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 203 which makes unfair
methods of competition unlawful. 204
Legal experts agree that the order is without legal foundation,
unenforceable, and without legal impact. 205 Recently the Center for
Democracy & Technology filed a lawsuit against the executive order to invalidate it. 206 In addition, the Court of the Northern District of New York ruled that the executive order precluded a private right of action even if defendants in that case arbitrarily
removed the plaintiff’s account or prevented him from creating a
207
new account. It is therefore likely that the immunity provided
under § 230 will remain strong where platforms host harmful content created by third parties, moderate content, and allow users to
share it.
In addition to the order, recent legislative bills strive to narrow
§ 230’s immunity. 208 The shadow of the order and the legislative
bills, however, might impair how intermediaries apply their First
Amendment rights to moderate content and lead all platforms to
chill more protected speech. 209
B. A Comparative Perspective
In Europe, the scope of intermediary liability is much broader
than in the United States, and the balance between freedom of
210
speech and protection of reputation is very different. The E202. Id. § 4(b).
203. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C § 45.
204. Exec. Order, supra note 196, at § 4(c).
205. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Trump’s “Preventing Online Censorship” Executive Order Is ProCensorship Political Theater, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 29, 2020), https://bit.ly/2B33vSk;
Jan Wolfe, Trump’s Order Taking Aim at Twitter Is ‘Bluster’: Legal Experts, REUTERS (May 28,
2020, 2:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-trump-executive-order-analysis
/trumps-order-taking-aim-at-twitter-is-bluster-legal-experts-idUSKBN234361 [https://
perma.cc/4CRN-759Z].
206. Complaint, Ctr. For Tech. & Democracy v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-01456 (D.D.C. Dec.
11, 2020), 2020 WL 2858041.
207. Gomez v. Zuckerburg, No. 5:20-cv-00633-TJM-TWD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130989
(N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020); see also Eugene Volokh, No Claim Against Facebook Based on President’s
Social Media Executive Order, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 31, 2020), https://reason.com
/volokh/2020/07/31/no-claim-against-facebook-based-on-presidents-social-media-executiveorder/ [https://perma.cc/K3DP-P6S4].
208. See S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020).
209. See Complaint, supra note 206, at ¶ 45.
210. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, 61 B.C. L.
Rev. 1687, 1729–30 (2020) (“In Europe, free expression is safeguarded by Article 10 of the
European Convention and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Like other European fundamental
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Commerce Directive dictates the framework for intermediary liability. According to Article 14, intermediaries that host content are
subject to a ‘notice-and-takedown’ regime that obligates them to
211
remove illegal content in order to avoid potential liability. “This
knowledge-based safe haven protects intermediaries whose role is
‘merely technical, automatic and passive,’ but does not shield in212
termediaries that play an active role in hosting the content.”
The Directive does not prevent Member States from establishing
specific requirements nor does it affect orders by national authori213
ties in accordance with national legislation. Member States can
impose duties of care on intermediaries through national legislation, requiring them to undertake reasonable efforts to detect and
214
prevent certain types of illegal activity. Thus, for example, in the
fall of 2017, the German government drafted the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) for targeting hate speech and fake
215
news. The Act applies to criminally offensive speech as defined in
216
the German Penal Code, including defamation. It stipulates a
rights, these provisions are subject to proportionality analysis – where they conflict with another fundamental right such as the right to privacy or to data protection, courts must balance the rights on an equal footing. By contrast, in the United States, the fundamental right
of free expression protected by the First Amendment is not subject to proportionality analysis . . . .”). See generally Pollicino & Bassini, supra note 182.
211. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, Art. 14(1) [hereinafter ECommerce Directive] (“Where an information society service is provided that consists of the
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure
that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient
of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
the information.”). For expansion on the E-Commerce Directive, see Lavi, supra note 54, at
870–71.
212. Lavi, supra note 53, at 46 (citing Joined Cases C-236 & C-238/08, Google France,
S.A.R.L. & Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, I-2513 (“[T]o establish whether the liability of a referencing service provider may be limited under Article
14 of Directive 2000/31, it is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service
provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive,
pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores.”); and Corey Omer,
Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289, 313
(2014)).
213. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 211, at Recital 47.
214. Id. at Recital 48.
215. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Oct. 1, 2017,
at § 3(2)(4) (Ger.), translation at https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungs
verfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc
/PH7B-6FYQ].
216. Wolfgang Schulz, Regulating Intermediaries to Protect Privacy Online – the Case of the
German NetzDG, in PERSONALITY AND DATA PROTECTION RIGHTS ON THE INTERNET (Marion
Albers & Ingo Sarlet eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5) (citing GERMAN PENAL CODE, §§
185–189, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html
[https://perma.cc/MQ89-WSQA]).
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differential timeframe for intermediaries to remove harmful con217
tent. Intermediaries “have to make sure that they delete content
that appears . . . evidently unlawful within 24 hours” of the filing of
218
a complaint. “When content is not evidently unlawful,” interme219
diaries have to remove it within seven days. The “[r]eview period
may exceed 7 days when more time is required for the decision220
making[, in order to minimize] ‘over-blocking.’” Failure to com221
ply with the law can lead to a fine of up to five million Euros.
The Directive is somewhat obsolete in that its classification may
no longer fit to each and every role intermediaries perform today.
Many intermediaries may not be classified as “hosts” since courts
222
Outside the scope of the Einterpret Article 14 narrowly.
223
Commerce Directive intermediaries’ liability can be broad. The
case of Delfi is one good example. In this case, “the Estonian Supreme Court found the popular Delfi news website liable for defamatory statements about a famous Estonian business execu224
tive.” Although Delfi followed a proper “notice-and-takedown”
225
regime and complied with the Directive, the Directive’s safe haven was not applied because “by allowing comments from unregis226
tered and anonymous users, the site is liable as a publisher.”
Thus, it was not considered a “host.”
Delfi then appealed to the European Court of Human Rights
227
228
(ECHR), claiming a violation of freedom of expression. The

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.; see also NetzDG, supra note 215, at § 3(2)(3). For further information and criticism, see BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 362–63; and Schulz, supra note 216.
221. Schulz, supra note 216, at 6.
222. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 871; Ronen Perry & Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech: Comparative and Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 205 (2014); Peggy Valcke &
Marieke Lenaerts, Who’s Author, Editor and Publisher in UGC Content? Applying Traditional Media Concepts to UGC Providers, 24 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTS. & TECH. 119, 126 (2010).
223. Lavi, supra note 54, at 871–74.
224. Id. at 871–72; see also Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, 344 (June 16,
2015).
225. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 222, at 221.
226. Lavi, supra note 54, at 872; see also Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, ¶28 (Oct.
10, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-126635%22]} (noting
that, in reviewing the decision of the Estonian Court, “the Supreme Court considered that
in the present case both the applicant company and the authors of the comments were to be
considered publishers of the comments”).
227. The ECHR “is charged with supervising the enforcement of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights . . . drawn up by the Council of Europe. . . . Individuals who believe their human rights have been violated and who are unable to remedy
their claim through their national legal system may petition the ECHR to hear the case and
render a verdict.” John G. Merrills, European Court of Human Rights, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Court-of-Human-Rights.
228. Delfi, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 327 (“The applicant company alleged that its freedom
of expression had been violated.”).
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First Section of the ECHR did not accept Delfi’s claim. It upheld
the Estonian Court’s ruling, finding that the ruling was in line with
230
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as a
proportional interference with the freedom of expression. The
231
Grand Chamber confirmed the decision. That decision has created confusion regarding what distinguishes online “publishers”
232
from mere intermediaries.
A narrow interpretation of the E-Commerce Directive was also
233
recently applied by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., a member of the National
Council of Austria sued Facebook Ireland in the Austrian courts,
seeking an order for Facebook to remove an allegedly defamatory
234
comment about her and equivalent comments. Although the ECommerce Directive does not stipulate a general monitoring obligation, the ECJ held that intermediaries such as Facebook are not
protected by EU Law from an order to remove content that is identical, and even potentially similar to, content previously declared
235
unlawful.
At present, the extent of the “notice-and-takedown” provisions is
unclear and it appears that the E-commerce Directive’s safe haven
236
is eroding. A narrow interpretation of “hosting” enables courts to
hold intermediaries accountable for negligence in preventing
third-party harm, despite removing defamatory content from their
237
platforms upon knowledge. In addition, requiring the removal of
similar or equivalent content when that content has already been

229. Delfi, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319.
230. Id. at 359, 366–67; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889. The Court applied a narrow interpretation of intermediary technical functions. For further information, see Martin
Husovec, ECtHR Rules on Liability of ISPs as a Restriction of Freedom of Speech, 9 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. & PRAC. 108, 109 (2014)1
231. Delfi, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 388; see also Lavi, supra note 54, at 872–73.
232. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 222, at 222; Lavi, supra note 54, at 872–73; Lavi, supra
note 53, at 48.
233. See generally Court of Justice in the European Union, EUROPA.EU, https://europa.eu
/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en [https://perma.cc/S77KGE66] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
234. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct.
3, 2019) (reviewing the decision of the Vienna Commercial Court).
235. Lavi, supra note 141, at 508; see also Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821. It
should be noted that the obligation is to block access to the information worldwide and not
only from within the EU domains of Facebook. For criticism that the obligation to remove
similar and equivalent content can lead to over-blocking and have a chilling effect on free
speech, see DAPHNE KELLER, STANFORD CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, DOLPHINS IN
THE NET: INTERNET CONTENT FILTERS AND THE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK
V. FACEBOOK IRELAND OPINION 18–19 (2019) (comparing false positives to dolphins in the
net).
236. Lavi, supra note 54, at 871.
237. Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, 365–66 (June 16, 2015).
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deemed unlawful imposes an obligation on intermediaries to use
238
the technology available to them to monitor the platform. This
obligation is beyond the traditional knowledge-based safe haven
239
outlined in the E-Commerce Directive.
The interpretation of the European Data Protection Directive
on the “right to be forgotten” also reflects an expansion of inter240
mediary liability. In Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española
241
de Protección de Datos, the ECJ supported what is known as the
“right to be forgotten.” 242 Specifically, the ECJ held that search engines, like Google, must remove search results that link to personal
information, including defamatory content found on third party
243
websites upon user request.
“The ECJ reached this conclusion by broadly interpreting the
term ‘controller’ in Article 2(d) of the Data Protection Di244
rective,” affirming that indexing personal data published on websites makes search engines data processors and controllers. 245 By
classifying search engines as controllers, the court implies that
“they are not neutral and passive enough to be eligible for the safe
harbors’ protection.” 246 In a recent decision, the ECJ held that “the
right to be forgotten” should apply to “search engine versions ac-

238. KELLER, supra note 235, at 11–12.
239. See generally E-Commerce Directive, supra note 212, at art. 14(1).
240. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
241. Case C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).
242. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 873 n.82 (“This right, now branded as the ‘right to erasure,’ was represented as one of the ‘four pillars’ of the new Regulation in the European Union. In October 2013, the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and
Home Affairs considered and consolidated nearly four thousand proposed amendments to
the Commission Proposal into a new proposal that was adopted by the Committee.”). For an
in-depth discussion, see Cooper Mitchell-Rekurt, Search Engine Liability Under the Libe Data
Regulation Proposal: Interpreting Third Party Responsibilities as Informed by Google Spain, 45 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 861 (2014); Abraham L. Newman, What the “Right to be Forgotten” Means for Privacy in
a Digital Age, SCI. MAG., Jan. 30, 2015, at 507; and NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY–
RETHINKING DIGITAL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 91 (2015).
243. Lavi, supra note 25, at 173; see also Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right To
Be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 507, 549 (2016) (explaining that this ruling is confined to searches made using the name of an individual and asserts a right to delist the
link—as opposed to a right to remove the information from the search engine’s index altogether); Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 541 (2015) (“To
comply with the judgment, Google offered EU citizens the ability to file data removal requests. Within 24 hours, the search engine received right to be forgotten requests from at
least 24,000 individuals.”); MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 10, 41,
46 (2016).
244. Data Protection Directive, supra note 240, at art. 2(d) (“Article 2(d) ‘controller’
shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”).
245. Lavi, supra note 54, at 874; see also Google Spain, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 at ¶ 41; Lavi,
supra note 32, at 2632.
246. Lavi, supra note 25, at 173; see also Peguera, supra note 243, at 544.
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cessible in EU Member States, as opposed to all versions of its
247
search engine worldwide.”
It should be noted that the Data Protection Directive was replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May
248
2018. The GDPR includes a specific provision titled “Right to
249
erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)” that imposes data controller ob250
ligations to erase data. In general, the GDPR imposes more spe251
cific obligations regarding information processing, and the ECJ
interprets intermediaries’ obligations in this regard broadly. 252
Other countries outside Europe outline different intermediary
liability regimes.253 Some jurisdictions have even passed anti-fake
news laws that are beyond private law, addressing infringement of
254
public interest. For example, a new law in Singapore allows the
255
government to order intermediaries to remove false statements.
247. Harlan Grant Cohen & Monika Zalnieriute, Google LLC v. Commission Nationale de
l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 261 (2020); see also Case C-507/17,
Google LLC v. Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Libertés (CNIL),
ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
248. The GDPR subjects “controllers” to a broader right to erasure. Regulation 2016
/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of
Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L119) 33 [hereinafter
GDPR]; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & Frederick Zuiderveen Bogesius,
The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. &
COMM. TECH. L. 65, 90 (2019) (“Roughly summarized, a data subject has a right to erasure
when he or she successfully exercises the right to object, when the personal data were unlawfully processed, should be erased because of a legal obligation, or are no longer necessary in relation to the processing purposes.”); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the
Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 68–69 (2017).
249. GDPR art. 17; Lavi, supra note 32, at 2634.
250. GDPR art. 17; see also Lavi, supra note 32, at 2634; JONES, supra note 243, at 10 (explaining that Article 17 to the GDPR, titled “Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten,’)” can
impose obligations on controllers to delete information from the internet altogether).
251. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard,
71 FLA. L. REV. 365 (2019).
252. E.g., C-136/17, GC v. Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés
(CNIL), ECLI:EU:C: 2019:773 (Sept. 24, 2019).
253. For further information, see Lavi, supra note 25, at 174, which expands on intermediary liability in Canada.
254. See The Rise of “Fake News” Laws Across South East Asia, PUB. MEDIA ALLIANCE (Dec. 6,
2019), https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/the-rise-of-fake-news-laws-across-south-east-asia
/ (overviewing Fake News Laws across South East Asia particularly on media freedom).
255. Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill, Parl. Bill No 10/2019,
§ 4 (2019), https://www.parliament.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library
/protection-from-online-falsehoods-and-manipulation-bill10-2019.pdf (section four of the
law refers to directions to internet intermediaries and providers of mass media services); see
also Jason Luger, Planetary Illiberalism and the Cybercity-state: In and Beyond Territory, 8
TERRITORY, POL., GOVERNANCE 1 (2019); Niharika Mandhana & Phred Dvorak, Ordered by
Singapore, Facebook Posts a Correction, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/facebook-complies-with-order-under-singapore-fake-news-law-11575116149. Such
laws were aimed at preserving political security, but governments can use them to prevent
damage to the public’s health that can occur as a result of believing fake news on Covid-19.
See Ellie Bothwell, Fake News Laws May ‘Catch On’ During Coronavirus, TIMES HIGHER ED.
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Yet, this regime poses a threat to free speech since it subjects the
intermediary directly to the government. 256 Moreover, the absence
of any definition of the term “false statement of fact” provides the
government overly broad discretion. 257
C. Liability Regimes: A Critical View
“Intermediary liability rests on the junction of a few areas of law.
258
It balances constitutional rights and tort considerations,” aiming
to find the right balance between values. On the one hand, the digital ecosystem allows anyone to publish harmful statements and potentially infringe upon the victim’s right to reputation and free
speech. On the other hand, liability can lead to collateral censorship “when a (private) intermediary suppresses the speech of oth259
ers in order to avoid liability” for such speech. Imposing liability
on the intermediary for false rumors may also constitute an in260
fringement on the freedom to conduct a business. In the United
States, “an individual’s right to conduct a business or pursue an
261
occupation is a property right.” Yet, freedom to conduct a business is not absolute. Companies are subject to certain basic requirements and remain accountable for decisions that might in262
fringe on individual rights.
In addition to constitutional balances, “the technological context of intermediary liability involves considering the influence of
liability on the path of innovation” and its repercussions on welfare
263
maximization. Courts should, therefore, not solely consider the
harm to victims but also the benefits of an activity to third par-

(Apr. 6, 2020), www.timeshighereducation.com/news/fake-news-laws-may-catch-duringcoronavirus.
256. See Tessa Wong, Singapore Fake News Law Polices Chats and Online Platforms, BBC NEWS
(May 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48196985.
257. On the flaws of specific legal liability frameworks for “fake news” and the difficulty
of defining “fake news,” see MINA, supra note 99, at 126.
258. Lavi, supra note 53, at 49.
259. Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 293, 295–96 (2011).
260. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) art. 16 (expressing that the EU was founded on the universal values of dignity, solidarity, freedom, and equality).
261. Garrison v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 438 S.E.2d 6, 7 (W. Va. 1993); see
also United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Arena, 180
F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999).
262. HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 121 (“Companies should generally have the freedom
to design technologies how they please, so long as they stay within particular thresholds, satisfy certain basic requirements like security and accuracy, and remain accountable for deceptive, abusive, and dangerous design decisions.”).
263. Lavi, supra note 53, at 49.
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264

ties. Their balance should include the overall costs and benefits
265
to society as a whole. Finding the right balance between these interests is the key to formulating a proper intermediary liability regime. It should be noted that the balance between values is subjective and differs between legal systems.
Different countries apply different policy models for intermedi266
ary liability, such as: overall immunity, a safe haven provision
267
(“notice-and-takedown”), and negligence liability for failing to
take reasonable precaution to prevent third-party harm. 268 These
policy models are either over- or under-inclusive. This section analyzes the shortcomings of common liability regimes governing secondary intermediary liability and argues that such regimes fail to
accommodate the challenges of dissemination of false rumors.
In a previous Article, I reached the conclusion that a “noticeand-takedown” safe haven regime is preferable to other regimes
for regulating secondary liability of intermediaries on social net269
270
work platforms. This type of regime is a compromise. Under
such a regime, intermediaries are not required to block or filter
content and they do not bear liability for harmful content they
271
were not informed about. Only intermediaries that fail to remove
272
harmful content upon notice expose themselves to liability. In
light of the extensive harm false rumors and defamation may cause
in social networks, this outcome is appropriate in comparison to an
273
immunity regime.
This analysis applies to liability for original speech. The vast
multitude of possibilities to quickly share content on social networks undermines the efficiency of a “notice-and-takedown” regime, since false rumors and defamatory content are speedily replicated. A victim aspiring to remove defamatory remarks would
need to send a complaint and indicate each and every virtual loca264. Id. at 56.
265. Lavi, supra note 141, at 536.
266. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (U.S. model).
267. See 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13 (EU model).
268. See Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, 344 (June 16, 2015) (Estonian
Model).
269. See Lavi, supra note 52, at 930–31.
270. See Celia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v.
America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 604–07 (2008)
(explaining that “notice-and-takedown” regimes can essentially lead to the removal of any
content in response to any complaint).
271. Lavi, supra note 54, at 887.
272. Id.; see COHEN, supra note 73, at 122 (this type of regime is supported by theories of
efficiency).
273. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 931 (outlining different liability regimes for different
types of social network platforms and arguing that adopting a “notice-and-takedown” safe
haven regime provides a proper balance between constitutional rights and welfare considerations).
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tion where the offending remarks appear. Due to the pace at
which content is disseminated on social networks, this could prove
274
to be an impossible mission. Moreover, between the time the
complaint is registered and the actual removal of content, the relevant content may continue to spread.
Applying “notice-and-takedown” or “right to be forgotten” regimes on search engines cannot confront the challenges of replication. Under these regimes, if the information was replicated to several websites and a search engine links to each and every one of
them separately, the victim may have to contact each search engine
275
about every single replication. Moreover, removing a link to offensive content from search results may not stop the circulation of
276
the content on various platforms. This process disproportionately
places the burden on victims without sufficiently mitigating harm.
Allowing complete immunity for intermediaries is even more
under-inclusive. Under such a regime, the intermediary does not
have a duty to remove defamation upon knowledge. Thus, even if
the victim contacts the intermediary immediately after publication,
the intermediary may still leave it on its platform. Consequently,
277
the content may continue to spread and inflict harm.
On the other hand, negligence liability is over-inclusive since
negligence standards are generally open-ended. “Interpreting
[negligence standards] involves cumbersome litigation and high
278
administrative costs.” Difficulties experienced by courts in conducting cost-benefit analysis may result in inconsistency and uncer279
tainty. Negligence liability may also lead to “hindsight bias” and
“outcome bias” because reasonable action is normally determined
280
after the harm has already been inflicted. “Consequently, courts

274. See RONSON, supra note 159, at 195–96.
275. The GDPR, supra note 248, art. 17.2, stipulates that “[w]here the controller has
made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal
data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation,
shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are
processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by controllers
of any links to, or copy or replication of, those data.” It is unclear what constitutes “reasonable steps” to erase replications. However, it is definitely clear that not erasing a replication
after receiving a particular notice regarding it is unreasonable.
276. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2654 (explaining that removing links from a search engine results only obscure the information and does not delete it altogether).
277. See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 221, 222 (2006); SOLOVE, supra note 161, at 157–59.
278. Lavi, supra note 54, at 886.
279. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschof, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1076 (1972).
280. Lavi, supra note 54, at 886; see also Yoed Halbersberg & Ehud Guttel, Behavioral Economics and Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS & LAW 405,
411–12 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (“Hindsight bias . . . distorts people’s ex
post assessments of the ex-ante probability and predictability of an event, given that this
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may conclude that the [intermediary was] negligent even if he
could not predict the harm ex ante and acted reasonably” at the
281
time. In the absence of a “safe haven,” negligence liability may
cast a heavy burden on the intermediary, resulting in a serious
282
chilling effect on free speech. Intermediaries can employ auto283
matic algorithmic enforcement, including Artificial Intelligence
284
algorithms that are not sensitive enough to context, to remove
285
controversial content even before receiving a complaint and still
286
remain exposed to liability. Moreover, algorithmic enforcement
can impose costs on free speech; it can distort the public discourse
287
by prioritizing certain types of content and erode democracy. A
negligence liability regime may also disincentivize innovations,

event has already happened . . . . The outcome bias is the tendency to perceive conduct that
resulted in a bad outcome as more careless than the same conduct in cases where the bad
outcome did not occur.”); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
281. Lavi, supra note 54, at 886.
282. See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND:
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 242 (MIT Press ed.,
2015) (explaining that vagueness in regulatory standards leads companies to implement
higher standards of regulation); Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech and Compelled Conformity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035–36 (2018) (in a related context of intermediary liability
for incitement to terror, even planned legislation regarding intermediary liability caused the
intermediary to overdo the removal of content by using digital tools in order to avoid potential liability).
283. See, e.g., Federico Guerrini, Facebook Will Flag and Filter Fake News In Germany, FORBES
(Jan.
16,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/2017/01/16/face
book-will-flag-and-filter-fake-news-in-germany/ (describing a new technological screening
tool that Facebook implemented due to the new German legislation that is expected to impose fines on the intermediary for fake news). For criticism on models of algorithmic enforcement, see Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016), which expounds on the growing use of
algorithms by online intermediaries and the challenges of such cooperation enforcement.
See also Benjamin Boroughf, The Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity,
and Fair Compensation, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 95, 107 (2015).
284. See Natasha Duarte, Emma Llansó & Anna Loup, Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis 1, 3 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. PAPER (2017), https:
//cdt.org/files/2017/12/FAT-conference-draft-2018.pdf (“Today’s tools for analyzing social
media text have limited ability to parse the meaning of human communication or detect the
intent of the speaker.”); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for
Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1362 (2018).
285. Intermediaries may voluntarily apply best practices in order to be exempt from liability. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Taking Users’ Rights to the Next Level: A
Pragmatist Approach, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 36 (2015).
286. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 181 (explaining that disseminators of harmful speech find ways to bypass algorithmic enforcement for example by disseminating a print screen picture file that algorithms might find difficult to detect. Indeed, algorithms are improving, but disseminators of harmful expressions are likely to find ways to
bypass algorithmic enforcement.).
287. For example, one of Facebook’s strategies for combating fake news is using algorithms to prioritize content. On the use of algorithms for degrading and decreasing the visibility of fake news, see Daisuke Wakabayashi & Mike Issac, In Race Against Fake News, Google
and Facebook Stroll to the Starting Line, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/35mUMoX.
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such as mechanisms for sharing content, and thus reduce important advantages of digital markets, technological innovation,
288
and the intermediary’s freedom to conduct a business. As a result, the positive externalities of sharing content are likely to decrease.
The above examination of overall immunity, “notice-andtakedown,” and negligence liability regimes for regulating secondary intermediary liability reveals that they are either over- or underinclusive. These regimes may, in fact, cause disproportionate
chilling effects or allow extensive reputational harm and infringement of public interest. Moreover, common liability regimes alone
are insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the prevalent dissemination of false rumors and defamation on social networks and
289
decentralized private platforms. While “notice-and-takedown” is
preferable to other regimes for regulating intermediary liability on
social network platforms, complementary mechanisms must also be
incorporated in order to be effective. It should be noted that the
harm of negative false rumors extends beyond the private individ290
ual’s reputation and also falls into the public interest. Therefore,
policy makers should develop more tools to protect the public interest.
The following Section will describe the changing role of intermediaries in a brave new technological world. It will argue that the
change in the intermediary’s role requires a new concept of their
accountability. As a first step, the Article will propose that the law
should adapt the safe haven regime to the new technological reality of sharing. It proposes a new framework for content regulation.
This framework is intended to mitigate the damage caused by dissemination of false rumors, defamation, and fake news, while preserving the benefits of dissemination and balancing the values at
the base of intermediary liability.

288. The ambiguity regarding liability in Europe, reviewed in Section I.3.B above, has
probably led many intermediaries to switch off readers’ comments. See Paul McNally, Guardian Digital Chief: Killing off Comments ‘a Monumental Mistake’, NEWS REWIRED (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.newsrewired.com/2015/02/03/guardian-digital-chief-killing-off-comments-amonumental-mistake. A negligence regime might also lead some intermediaries to avoid
mechanisms that enable sharing at the click of a button. See id.
289. See MINA, supra note 99, at 126.
290. See Ben Shahar, supra note 11 (labeling this as “data pollution content” and proposing to use administrative and criminal law tools modeled on environmental law regulation).
This Article will propose different solutions that focus on design.
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D. Reevaluating the Role and Obligations of Intermediaries in Light of
Technological Developments
People once thought of the internet as a sovereign-free medium
controlled from the “bottom-up” by users without intermediation
291
where anyone could publish anything without prior editing. Instead, the internet simply shifted intermediation by creating new
292
media gatekeepers. These intermediaries are not mere conduits,
293
as they control the flow of information. While it seems as if everyone “can publish freely and instantly online,” many intermediaries in fact “actively curate the content” that their users post on
294
their platforms. Intermediaries can organize the flow of information, promote or withhold ideas, and influence social dynam295
ics. “They act as centers for disseminating information and pos296
sess an essential role in directing the attention of users.” For
297
example, intermediaries moderate user-generated content by us298
ing various strategies that are hidden from public view, with in299
sufficient transparency. Different intermediaries have different

291. Lavi, supra note 53, at 11–12 (citing Barlow, supra note 20). Barlow started the spirit
of wide-eyed techno-utopianism.
292. See David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201, 1201 (2012) (explaining that platforms often develop government mechanisms through which they monitor and manage “bad” behavior, thereby acting
as gatekeepers); MARANTZ, supra note 39, at 70. See generally COHEN, supra note 73, at 37–38,
75 (explaining that some aspects the conception of “technologies of freedom” changed beyond recognition and today’s networked digital information infrastructure have different
and more complicated affordances).
293. Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 220 (2018) (explaining that because YouTube structures, sorts and sometimes sells users’ data, it is not a
passive conduit); see also Balkin, supra note 183, at 2297–98 (2014); Derek E. Bambauer,
Middlemen, 64 FLA. L. REV. 64, 65 (2013).
294. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1599 (2018); see also SARAH T ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN:
CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 93–161 (2019) (describing how
different types of low-wage human contractors moderate content); Rory Van Loo, Federal
Rules of Platform Procedure, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (on file
with the author) (describing how Facebook cut off vital avenues for speech and sharing information, account termination and even deprives a user of valuable property without adequate transparency).
295. Michal Lavi, Online Intermediaries: With Power Comes Responsibility, JOLT DIG.
(May 11, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/online-intermediaries-with-powercomes-responsibility.
296. Id.
297. See TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT
MODERATION AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 5–6 (2018); Kate
Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free
Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2427 (2020) (“Content moderation is the industry term for a
platform’s review of user-generated content posted on its site and the corresponding decision to keep it up or take it down.”).
298. Klonick, supra note 297, at 2427.
299. See id. at 2418 (describing how Facebook built institutions for oversight and explaining that only after facing outside pressure from media, government, and the civil society did
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300

attitudes towards moderation and different rules of community.
Intermediaries can structure user participation on their platforms
301
and push users to disclose and share information. Twitter for example, uses their algorithms to “influence what is viewed, what is
302
valued, and what is disseminated and re-disseminated by users.”
303
They collect information on users, personalize content, and influence users’ behavior, decision-making processes, social dynam304
ics, the content they create, and even how they participate in
305
democracy. For that reason, intermediaries have been dubbed
306
the “New Governors of online speech.”
As technologies advance and the role of the intermediary as
moderator of the flow of information becomes a fundamental aspect of any platform, the duties of intermediaries should be recon307
sidered. Reevaluating intermediaries’ roles and duties is of par-

Facebook insert more transparency into its moderation practices and dedicate more resources to enforcement). These measures however are insufficient. Moreover, other media
giants might be even less transparent regarding their moderation practices.
300. See Shannon Bond, Critics Slam Facebook but Zuckerberg Resists Blocking Trump’s Posts,
NPR (June 11, 2020), https://n.pr/37mIoqm (“When Trump tweeted an identical message,
Twitter took the novel step of hiding the tweet behind a warning label, saying it broke its
rules against glorifying violence. Zuckerberg saw it differently. Even though he was personally disgusted by the president’s inflammatory rhetoric, he said, the post did not break Facebook’s rules against inciting violence.”); Douek, supra note 182, at 5 (explaining that major
platforms, are crafted around two different precepts: proportionality and probability).
301. See supra Section I.D.
302. Lavi, supra note 295; see also Alex Hern, Twitter Hides Donald Trump Tweet for ‘Glorifying Violence,’ THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2020/may/29/twitter-hides-donald-trump-tweet-glorifying-violence.
303. See ZUBOFF, supra note 115, at 466 (describing the rise of surveillance capitalism);
FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 130, at 117–18 (describing the emotional cognition
experiment that shows that intermediaries can control what is seen and what is disseminated). In another related context, Facebook allowed advertisers to target advertisements on
specific topics to hate groups. See Julia Angwin, Madeleine Varner & Ariana Tobin,
Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters’, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters; Kerri
A. Thompson, Commercial Clicks: Advertising Algorithms as Commercial Speech, 21 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 1019 (2019).
304. See GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 23 (“Platforms may not shape the public discourse
by themselves, but they do shape the shape of the public discourse. And they know it.”).
305. See Jonathan Zittrain, supra note 55, at 335; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 131, at 87–
89 (describing how personalized content affected the 2016 election); Carole Cadwalladr &
Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica
in Major Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news
/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election.
306. Klonick, supra note 294, at 1603.
307. See Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2–3) (“[F]ollowing years of laissez-faire attitudes in legislatures, lawmakers are looking for ways to regulate the technology companies that exert so much influence over our
lives.”). Recently, even Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has conceded that the internet
needs new rules. Mark Zuckerberg, Opinion, The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These
Four Areas, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/markzuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f05
04-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html.
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ticular importance, especially in light of the recent attack on
308
§ 230.
As I have proposed elsewhere, intermediaries that influence users to publish and share false rumors and defamation, in particu309
lar, can be held liable under a contributory liability regime. Intermediaries that publish defamation themselves, or mix their own
content with users’ defamatory content, might bear direct liability
310
for defamation. But what about the liability of intermediaries
that make no particular effort to promote or publish harmful content? Should the law impose an obligation on intermediaries just
because they sway influence on users to publish more content,
even if they have not promoted or repeated offensive content in
particular?
The power of intermediaries to shape the flow of information
has inspired debate in legal scholarship. “Recent scholarship
acknowledges that twenty-first century intermediaries . . . cannot be
treated as mere passive conduits and that their role and duties
311
should be reconceptualized.” Thus, new concepts of the intermediary’s role are being developed. Different scholars have observed the influences of intermediaries in different ways and have
proposed different types of legal obligations.
Even though intermediaries are private entities, some scholars
have proposed that since they control the information infrastructures that serve the public, they should be treated as public forums,
312
or at least hybrid bodies. These scholars argue that intermediaries should be treated as state actors and therefore subjected to the
313
First Amendment and other basic public law standards. This per-

308. See Exec. Order, supra note 196, and the new bills, supra note 208, that propose to
amend § 230.
309. See Lavi, supra note 53; Lavi, supra note 141, at 478.
310. Lavi, supra note 25.
311. Lavi, supra note 141, at 544; see also, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content
Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1373 (2018).
312. Kyle Langvardt, A New Deal for the Online Public Sphere, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 341,
380–81 (2018) (proposing that nonstate regulators such as online platforms can be perceived as state agencies); K. Sabeel Rahman, Private Power, Public Values: Regulating Social Infrastructure in a Changing Economy, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1668 (2018) (proposing to apply public utilities concept on online platforms); Orit Fischman-Afori, Online Rulers as Hybrid
Bodies: The Case of Infringing Content Monitoring, 23 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2020)
(proposing that online platforms should be treated as hybrid bodies and subject them to
public law standards).
313. Rahman, supra note 312, at 1687. It should be noted that profiles of government
entities and government representatives are already treated as public forums. See, e.g., Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). For example, the court ruled that thenPresident Donald Trump could not block Twitter followers due to their dissenting views because to do so is a violation of their First Amendment right to participate in a “designated
public forum.” See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
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ception of intermediaries was rejected by the Ninth Circuit decision in Prager University v. Google LLC; the court concluded that
314
YouTube is not a public forum. Such a perception, however, is
somewhat reflected in the recent executive order that declared: “It
is the policy of the United States that large online platforms, such
as Twitter and Facebook, as the critical means of promoting the
free flow of speech and ideas today, should not restrict protected
315
speech.”
As Professor Balkin has explained, ultimately, imposing the full
spectrum of public forum obligations on intermediaries is undesir316
able and would actually make things worse.
It would do nothing to prevent third parties from using social media to manipulate end users, stoke hatred, fear, and
prejudice, or spread fake news. And because social media
would be required to serve as [a] neutral public forum
[and obligated to equality], they could do little to stop
317
this.
Even if social media platforms desist from curating feeds, they
would still collect and harvest data on their end-users, either directly or by using third parties, such as mobile apps, as recently
318
leaked documents from Facebook demonstrate. This data, in

314. 951 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2020). Prager University claimed that, by classifying
some of their videos as “Restricted Content,” YouTube attempted to silence “conservative
viewpoints and perspectives on public issues,” censored their content, and violated their
First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the case concluding that:
“Despite YouTube’s ubiquity and its role as a public-facing forum, it remains a private forum, not a public forum subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.” Id.
315. Exec. Order, supra note 196, at 34,081. A prior version of this sentence referenced
the public forum doctrine. See Goldman, supra note 205.
316. Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain (Hoover Working Group on Nat’l
Sec., Tech. & L., Aegis Series Paper No. 1814) (“Treating social media companies as public
forums or public utilities is not the proper cure. It may actually make things worse.”) [hereinafter Balkin, Grand Bargain]; Balkin, supra note 170 (“Converting all large social media
companies into public utilities does not solve the problems I mentioned above, because it
does not provide diverse affordances, value systems, and innovations.”).
317. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 6; see also Langvardt, supra note 311, at
1367 (“[T]he more significant difficulty with applying the state action doctrine to the platforms lies in the fact that internet platforms can “evict” unwanted speakers without involving
the courts.”); Citron & Franks, supra note 194, at 62–63.
318. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 6; Sebastian Klovig Skelton & Bill Goodwin, Lawmakers Study Leaked Facebook Documents Made Public Today, COMPUT. WKLY. (Nov. 6,
2019), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252473540/Lawmakers-study-leaked-Face
book-documents-made-public-today; Facebook Sold a Rival-Squashing Move as Privacy Policy,
Documents Reveal, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2019/nov/06/facebook-privacy-switcharoo-plan-emails.
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turn, could be sold to third parties, who could use it on their sites
319
or elsewhere and influence the flow of information.
A second proposal is to view intermediaries as a hybrid between
320
a conduit and a media company. Intermediaries not only host
content but they also connect users, organize content, make content searchable, and recommend relevant content to users through
algorithms. Their algorithms select certain content and gives it
preference over other content based on judgments of relevance
321
and considerations of keeping users on the site. Intermediaries
create an ecosystem of networked journalism through personalized
recommendations and contribute to how news is made. 322 They are
a key pathway to news, even surpassing print newspapers as a news
323
source. Arguably, as the similarities between intermediaries and
media companies grow, intermediaries should be subjected to
some of the professional norms and standards that apply to tradi324
tional media. Indeed, some intermediaries already apply professional standards and restrict specific types of content on their plat325
forms in their terms of service and community standards. Yet, the
326
law still has a role in shaping the framework.
A third proposal is the concept of information fiduciaries. This
approach likens the obligation of intermediaries towards user information to the fiduciary duties of doctors and lawyers towards
patients and clients. “Just as the law imposes special duties of care,

319. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 6 (“[T]reating social media as public forums would only affect the ability of social media themselves to manipulate end users. It
would do nothing to prevent third parties from using social media to manipulate end users,
stoke hatred, fear, and prejudice, or spread fake news.”).
320. See generally Mary Louise Kelly, Media or Tech Company? Facebook’s Profile Is Blurry,
NPR (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601560213/media-or-tech-comp
any-facebooks-profile-is-blurry (explaining that lawmakers and regulators have a hard time
determining whether Facebook is a media or tech company).
321. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 43 (“As soon as Facebook changed from delivering a reverse chronological list of materials that users posted on their walls to curating an
algorithmically selected subset of those posts in order to generate a News Feed, it moved
from delivering information to producing a media commodity out of it.”).
322. Erin C. Carrol, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking Beyond the First
Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. REV. 529, 531–32 (2020).
323. Katherine Schaeffer, U.S. Has Changed in Key Ways in The Past Decade, from Tech Use to
Demographics, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019
/12/20/key-ways-us-changed-in-past-decade/ (“Social media is now a key pathway to news
for Americans. In 2018, for the first time, social media sites surpassed print newspapers as a
news source for Americans.”).
324. See GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 43; Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 8 (giving examples of professional standards that social media should live up to, such as adhering
to professional standards of journalistic ethics).
325. See, e.g., Community Standards: Bullying and Harassment, FACEBOOK, https://www.face
book.com/communitystandards/bullying (last visited May 11, 2020) (“[Facebook will] remove content that’s meant to degrade or shame, including, for example, claims about
someone’s sexual activity.”).
326. See Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316.
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confidentiality, and loyalty on doctors [and] lawyers [with regard
to] their patients and clients, . . . it [should] impose special duties
on [intermediaries] such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter [towards] their users.” 327 Intermediaries resemble fiduciaries because,
much like lawyers and doctors, they receive—and even actively collect—personal information and are trusted to treat it with care. Intermediaries obtain information that their users knowingly disseminate on their platforms and actively collect incidental information
on their users’ engagement on the platform that leaves digital
328
traces. Therefore, some have argued that the law should impose
duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty on intermediaries and
329
limit how they can profit from their users and beneficiaries. The
nature of fiduciary obligations should depend on the nature of the
relationship and the potential risk for abuse in using the infor330
mation by the more powerful party to the relationship. In our
context, “[i]ntermediaries should neither breach user trust nor
take actions that users would reasonably consider unexpected or
331
abusive.” As information fiduciaries, intermediaries should have
a duty not to utilize user data to influence or even manipulate
332
them. This view strives to impose on intermediaries duties to operate their platforms with good faith, respect for users, and non333
manipulation. “It should be noted that the information fiduciary
[approach] raises challenges regarding its feasibility, enforceability
334
and scope.”
327. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 498 (2019); see also Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 12.
328. See Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden
Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 25–26 (2019) (“[B]oth the information
we knowingly disseminate about ourselves when we visit websites, make online purchases,
and post photographs and videos on social media, and the information we unwittingly provide (e.g., when those websites record data about how long we spend reading them, where
we are when we access them, and which advertisements we click on) reveals a great deal
about who we are, what interests us, and what we find amusing, tempting, and off-putting.”);
TUROW, supra note 116, at 34 (explaining that intermediaries can collect data on consumers
online by tracking browsing activities, clicks, cookies and actual purchases); ZUBOFF, supra
note 115, at 80 (“[T]hese include websites visited, psychographics, browsing activity and information about previous advertisements that the users have been shown, selected and/or
made purchases after viewing.”).
329. E.g., Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 12.
330. Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11,15 (2020).
331. Lavi, supra note 53, at 68; see also Balkin, supra note 330, at 13; Jack M. Balkin, The
First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 1006–08 (2018); Jack M. Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1229 (2016).
332. Lavi, supra note 53, at 68 (citing Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, COLUM. L.
REV. 2011, 2049 (2018)); Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 14.
333. Lavi, supra note 141, at 545 n.458 (citing Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A
Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https:
//www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/).
334. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2641 n.186. For a critique of the theory of information fiduciaries, see Khan & Pozen, supra note 327.
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Unlike the EU GDPR data protection obligations, the concept
of information fiduciaries does not rely on structuring privacy by
336
obtaining user consent for individual transactions. “Rather, the
fiduciary approach holds digital fiduciaries to obligations of good
faith and non-manipulation regardless of” their particular privacy
337
policies. Defining the appropriate concept for the intermediary
is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the dissemination of false rumors. Be that as it may, the growing influence of intermediaries on the flow of information may justify the imposition
of obligations on intermediaries that go beyond traditional liability
regimes. Designing the appropriate legal governance that should
apply to online intermediaries is one of the most urgent legal challenges at this time. Many scholars believe it is high time to change
the overall immunity regime applied to intermediaries and adapt it
338
to the high degree of influence they exert over users. In the context of intermediary accountability for harmful false rumors, this
Article proposes imposing concrete obligations upon intermediaries to mitigate the harm of dissemination of false rumors. In con339
trast to the executive order of Donald Trump, the 45th President
of the United States, the proposal does not undermine intermediaries’ practices of moderation and preserves freedom of expression.
III. MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF SPREADING FALSEHOODS ON
SOCIAL NETWORKS
Intermediaries use different strategies to facilitate dissemination
340
of content in their attempts to increase profits. As previously ex341
plained, content dissemination provides multiple benefits. The
challenge becomes how to allow the free flow of information while
simultaneously preventing the dissemination of harmful content.
To meet this challenge, I will focus on the design stage of a plat335. GDPR, supra note 248. See generally infra Part I.
336. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 14 (“[C]ontractual models will prove insufficient if end users are unable to assess the cumulative risk of granting permission and
therefore must depend on the good will of data processors. The fiduciary approach to obligation does not turn on consent to particular transactions. . . .”).
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Sylvain, supra note 293, at 258 (2018); Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs
on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. COLUM. U. (2018), https://knightcolumbia.
org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data (“[T]hese developments undermine any notion that online intermediaries deserve immunity because they are mere conduits for, or
passive publishers of, their users’ expression.”).
339. See Exec. Order, supra note 196.
340. See id.
341. See id.
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form’s lifecycle. One solution focuses on reducing irresponsible
dissemination ex ante at the stage of the user’s decision to share
content. The second solution strives to mitigate harm ex post facto.
A. Protecting the Right to Reputation and Public Interest by Design
In the book Code Version 2.0, Lawrence Lessig identified four key
forces that regulate the online environment. 342 First, laws regulate
and constrain activities and can impose sanctions when activity violates them. For example,”[c]opyright law, defamation law, and obscenity laws all continue to threaten ex post sanction for the viola343
tion of legal rights” online. Second, norms restrict activities by
stigmatizing violations. For example, “talk about Democratic politics in the alt.knitting newsgroup, and you open yourself to flam344
ing.” In other words, violation of the norms in a newsgroup increases the likelihood of encountering insults and hostile
345
aggressive interactions. Third, the market limits activities by
price-setting, thus high prices can constrain access of individuals to
346
goods and services. Fourth, technologies can constrain by “code,”
meaning that the software and hardware design can define freedoms online, affect user choices, and regulate their interactions.
For example, some websites require a person to enter a password
and identify himself before gaining access; on other sites, a person
347
can enter whether identified or not. These four governance sys348
tems all interact simultaneously.
In recent years, there has been an increasing use of technologybased solutions to prevent harm inflicted by the free flow of information. Architecture of online platforms, namely the way they are
designed, can involve the creation of structures to prevent harm
from arising and shape attitudes towards violations of law and

342. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 121–125 (2006).
343. Id. at 124.
344. See, e.g., id. at 124–26.
345. See id. at 124 (“[T]alk too much in a discussion list, and you are likely to be placed
on a common bozo filter. In each case, a set of understandings constrain behavior, again
through the threat of ex post sanctions imposed by a community.”). For expansion on flaming, see generally Patrick B. O’ Sullivan & Andrew J. Flanagin, Reconceptualizing ‘Flaming’ and
other Problematic Messages, 5 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 69 (2003).
346. Id.
347. See id. at 125; Tal Zarsky, Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of Social Media,
35 PACE L. REV. 138, 139 (2015) (adjusting the model to social media).
348. See COURTNEY BOWMAN, ARI GESHER, JOHN K. GRANT, DANIEL SLATE & ELISSA
LERNER, THE ARCHITECTURE OF PRIVACY: ON ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES THAT CAN
DELIVER TRUSTWORTHY SAFEGUARDS 13 (2015) (referring to the interaction of code and law
as “East Coast” code and “West Coast” code).
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349
350
norms ex ante, as well as promote values. Studies have emphasized the power of architecture to account for human values and
technology user rights “in a principled and comprehensive manner
351
throughout the design process.” Other studies have focused on
strategies of influence, starting with behavioral influences of the
design on decision-making and continuing with the role of code in
outlining possibilities by altering the platform’s design to “make
352
certain conduct more difficult or costly.”
Decisions made by engineers can unleash new technology not
previously foreseen by the legislator, which may affect fundamental
353
rights. Scholarly work has already explored the influence of
technological governance systems and their potential to protect
privacy. This concept of privacy by design was developed into a philosophy that focuses on regulation of the technological design ex
ante instead of providing ex post remedies to victims of dissemina354
tion of harmful information. Researchers have described how to
make privacy-protective features a core part of functionality and
355
accommodate threats to privacy. Scholars have also noted that
the primary challenges of privacy by design are enhancing the
356
specification and incentivizing firms to adopt this approach.

349. See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 100 (2004).
350. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 110, at 701, 708–09. (“Designing technology to
“bake in” values offers a seductively elegant and effective means of control.”).
351. Deirdre K Mulligan & Jenifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 1019 (2012) (quoting Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, Jr., & Alan Borning, DEP’T OF COMPUT. SCI. & ENG’G, UNIV. OF WASH., CSE TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 02-12-01,
VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN: THEORY AND METHODS (2002)). For instance, “ ‘Value-Sensitive
Design’ is an approach that advocates identifying human needs and values and taking them
into account in the design process.” Lavi, supra note 141, at 553 n.504 (citing Noemi Manders-Huits & Jeroen van den Hove, The Need for Value-Sensitive Design of Communication Infrastructures, in EVALUATING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 51, 54–55 (Paul Sollie & Marcus Düwell eds.,
2009); Mulligan & King, supra).
352. Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 775, 778 (2014) (noting that
these strategies are blended and recombined); see also TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 264–65 (addressing the power of technology to target content and facilitate
viral spread).
353. Lavi, supra note 141, at 553.
354. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW & POLICY 190–
91 (2016); see also, e.g., KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE
GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 32, 178 (2015);
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 348; ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 1, 2 (2009).
355. See, e.g., BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 348; Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1420–21 (2011); Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog,
Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385, 395, 402–417 (2013) (referring to a narrow approach to privacy (obscurity of data) and overview strategies to protect privacy by design);
Serge Egelman, Janice Tsai, Lorrie Cranor & Alessandro Acquisti, Timing Is Everything? The
Effects of Timing and Placement of Online Privacy Indicators, PROC. A.C.M. S.I.G.C.H.I. CONF. ON
HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUT. SYS. 319 (2009).
356. See Rubinstein, supra note 355, at 1416; Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 355, at 392.
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Regulators around the world have discovered the benefits of privacy by design. They have set forth guidelines and promoted legal
regulation that includes privacy by design, alongside efforts to incentivize stakeholders to adopt this approach as part of their busi357
ness models. A central example is Article 25 of the GDPR that
358
addresses “data protection by design and default,” building privacy-friendly systems starting at the beginning of the design pro359
cess. Accordingly, at the stage of the system development, and at
the time of processing, controllers must “implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures” in order to “protect the
360
rights of data subjects.” “Data protection by default” is required
to assure that data that is unnecessary for processing is not gath361
ered. Examples of data protection by design are “anonymisation
and pseudonymisation of personal data, a data minimisation approach during processing and storing data, storage limitation,
transparency regarding processing and limited access to personal
362
data.”
“The GDPR protects data of EU citizens, but it [also] applies to
non-EU companies that offer goods or services to EU consum363
ers.” Thus, the GDPR can also affect data protection in the United States and throughout the world. Furthermore, the GDPR contains a “threshold test for international transfers of personal data
to [non-member states] and a legal basis for blocking data exports
364
to [states] that do not meet this standard.” The threshold for extraterritorial transmissions is the “adequacy” of data protection in
365
the foreign jurisdiction. With regard to transmissions to the
United States, instead of an adequacy determination, the Europe357. See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03
/120326privacyreport.pdf; HOOFNAGLE, supra note 354, at 191 (“[T]he FTC is embracing
privacy by design.”); see also A Comprehensive Approach On Personal Data Protection in the
European Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 609) 12 (2010); Edwards & Veale, supra note 248,
at 77.
358. GDPR, supra note 248, at art. 25.
359. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 248, at 77 (explaining that by doing so, it recognizes that “a regulator cannot do everything by top-down control, but . . . controllers must
themselves be involved in the design” of systems that minimize invasion of privacy).
360. GDPR, supra note 248, at art. 25.
361. Edwards & Veale, supra note 248, at 77 (quoting GDPR, supra note 248, art. 25).
362. Oliver Vettermann, Self-Made Data Protection—Is It Enough? Prevention and After-care of
Identity Theft, 10 Eur. J.L. & Tech. § 4.2 (2019).
363. Lavi, supra note 141, at 563 n.559.
364. Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 784
(2019).
365. Id. (“In Article 45, the GDPR requires that the Commission consider a long list of
factors in assessing the adequacy of protection, including ‘the rule of law, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, both general and sector, . . . as well as
the implementation of such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security
measures.’ ” (quoting GDPR, supra note 248, at art. 45(2)(a)).
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an Union and the United States have reached an arrangement
called “Privacy Shield,” a voluntary private sector compliance pro366
gram. This bilateral agreement “present[s] a list of substantive
367
EU principles for American companies to follow voluntarily.” Recently, however, the ECJ in Luxembourg struck down the Privacy
Shield in the case of Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland
368
Ltd., determining that the Privacy Shield agreement did not limit
the U.S. authorities’ access to data “in a way that satisfies requirements that are essentially equivalent to those required . . . under
EU law.” The impact of the ruling is not yet clear. The GDPR, thus,
has global impact today, more than ever, and the principles of privacy by design can influence the engineering of privacy outside of
369
Europe.
As mentioned, most discussions on behavioral influences of design and the technological constraints of code have focused on privacy protection. This Article proposes to adopt this strategy for
preventing impulsive dissemination of false rumors, defamation,
and fake news, and suggests incentives that would lead intermediaries to adopt these proposals. Platform design and code have
promising potential to protect personal reputation from harm. In
fact, the same technologies, strategies, and principles used by intermediaries to promote dissemination of content can be utilized
to mitigate harm inflicted by the dissemination of falsehoods. Due
to the potential of these strategies for the protection of reputations
and the public interest in general, engineers, managers, and policy
makers should develop a concept of “Reputation and Public Interest-by-Design.” The importance of design for the protection of
reputations is reinforced by the insufficiency of current law to ac370
commodate the challenge of fast-spreading falsehoods. This concept not only protects the private interests of victims of falsehoods,
but it also has a role in promoting the public interest in truthful
information.
366. It should be noted that in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, the ECJ declared
that this safe harbor was invalid. Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015 ¶ 98 (Oct. 6, 2015). Following the decision in that case, the United States and the European Union came to an
agreement on the Privacy Shield. See Commission Implementing Decision of July 12, 2016
Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection by the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:207:TOC.
367. See Schwartz, supra note 364, at 802.
368. Case C-311/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 ¶ 185 (July 16, 2020).
369. Beata A. Safari, Intangible Privacy Rights: How Europe’s GDPR Will Set a New Global
Standard For Personal Data Protection, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 809, 816–20 (2017); Schwartz,
supra note 364, at 777 (“[P]rinciples found in the GDPR, such as data portability and the
‘right to be forgotten,’ are already influencing laws outside Europe.”); see also, e.g., Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 251, at 420.
370. See supra Part II.
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B. From Nudges to Accountable Dissemination of Information
In their seminal book Nudge, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein
show that policy makers can arrange decision-making contexts and
thus nudge individuals to change their behavior. 371 A nudge is “any
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives.”372 Under this idea of ‘libertarian paternalism,’ 373 the individual who designs the environment for
people’s decision making—the “choice architect” 374—may anticipate their behavior, respond to this prediction, and direct them to
375
act in a certain way. This concept is also applicable to preventing
third-party harm; for example, nudges can be used to reduce “texting and driving” and, therefore, reduce accidents that would
376
cause harm to third parties. “Advocates of the nudge approach
believe that choice-preserving alternatives are preferable to mandates.” 377 The nudge concept has attracted controversy, objections
and ethical concerns; yet, it has also achieved widespread recognition among policy makers and has even led to reforms. 378
379
Sunstein and Thaler reviewed many examples of nudges. For
example, a charity debit card that keeps a record of an individual’s
donations and ensures that their bank adds their donations to
their end-of-year IRS statement makes donating more attractive
380
and incentivizes individuals to donate more. A nudge commit371. Lavi, supra note 53, at 4 (citing THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30); see also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (2014) (delving deeper
into the debate about the rationales and objections of nudges).
372. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 6.
373. SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 358–59 (emphasizing the idea of continuum and recognizing that approaches that impose high psychological costs are not as soft as approaches
that impose low material costs).
374. See Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, in THE
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 428 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012).
375. Lavi, supra note 53, at 4.
376. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 371 at 9, 44; Christopher McCrudden & Jeff King, The Dark
Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism, in CHOICE
ARCHITECTURE IN DEMOCRACIES, EXPLORING THE LEGITIMACY OF NUDGING 67, 93 (Alexandra
Kemmerer, Christoph Möllers, Maximilian Steinbeis & Gerhard Wagner eds., 2016) (arguing that by referring to “texting while driving” and “fuel standards” as areas where nudging
is appropriate, harm can be prevented).
377. Lavi, supra note 53, at 8; see also Calo, supra note 352, at 783; Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210 (2014).
378. Lavi, supra note 53, at 9; see also Thaler, supra note 373, at 331; Cass R. Sunstein, Do
People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177 (2016).
379. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237.
380. See Yang Wang, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Xiaoxuan Chen, Saranga Komanduri, Gregory Norcie, Kevin Scott, Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Norman Sadeh, From Facebook Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO STATE L.J. 1307, 1319–23, 1331 (2013) (arguing that designing mechanisms that nudge users to consider the content and context of
their online disclosures are efficient in helping individuals avoid regrettable online disclo-
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ting people to a specific action, such as exercising more frequently,
381
can help them achieve their goals. By emailing announcements
about failures or successes to family and friends, or monitoring a
person’s goals via a group blog, peer pressure “nudges” people to
382
fulfil their goals. A red warning light on a water filter or an air
383
conditioner “nudges” individuals to replace the filter. Devices
and apps such as GPS and Waze can “nudge” users by showing
384
them the most efficient route of driving. Organizing the default
settings on websites and the order of choices in online menus can
also serve as a type of nudge. 385
A central example of a nudge that is relevant to our context is a
“civility check” on a message that a person intends to send. Each
and every hour, people send out angry emails that they soon re386
gret. A “civility check” nudges individuals to file the message and
387
wait a day before deciding whether to send it; meanwhile, the individual might calm down and reconsider. Technology can facilitate this civility check by detecting whether an email is angry, cautioning him that it appears to be uncivil, and asking whether he
really wants to send it. A stronger version might delay dissemination of uncivil emails by default and force individuals to invest extra efforts in order to bypass the delay, such as requiring the enter388
ing a social security number. This nudge would lead individuals
to reflect upon whether they truly wish to send the email.
Nudge-based strategies can be smoothly transplanted to social
media because technology makes it easy to arrange decision389
making contexts, compared to a brick-and-mortar environment,
and such strategies are becoming more powerful in platform-

sures and, thus, enhance their privacy); Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loewenstein, Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 J.
CONSUMER RSCH. 858 (2011).
381. Thus, whenever a user tweets, the intermediary informs him that his tweets will appear in the timelines of his followers. However, this message appears only after dissemination and the “status-quo-bias” reduces the likelihood of ex post facto deletion by the user. See
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 34 (explaining that people have a general tendency to
stick with the current situation, this phenomenon is dubbed the “status-quo-bias”).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 237.
384. Id. at 242.
385. Id. at 8.
386. Id. at 237.
387. Id. at 237.
388. Id. at 237–38.
389. Programming platforms is easier than designing brick-and-mortar architecture. See
Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 (1) DAEDELUS 18, 19 (2016) (addressing the ability of online players to predict user behavior and influence it by nudges);
RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 341–42 (2015)
(addressing how the possibility to shape nudges easily influences their efficiency).
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390

based, massively intermediated environments. By understanding
users’ cognitive biases, technology can influence their behavior
and social dynamics. In practice, intermediaries use nudges to direct user behavior and to influence these users to share more content with a wider audience. 391
Framing relationships as friendships, selective algorithmic social
mirroring of content on user newsfeeds, and explicit and implicit
feedbacks constitute nudges. Intermediaries, thus, organize the
context in which users make decisions to disseminate information.
These influences extend beyond the individual as they generate
the social dynamics of dissemination at the macro level of the so392
cial network. Yet, every user can choose to disseminate information or avoid dissemination.
Dissemination of content is neither good nor bad in and of itself. While dissemination has many benefits, it can inflict severe
393
harm. The challenge is to diminish dissemination of offensive
content without chilling information flows in general. Intermediaries should harness the same nudge-based strategies to promote accountability in dissemination and discourage impulsiveness.
Whenever a user of social networks clicks the “publish,” “forward,” “share,” or “re-tweet” buttons, the intermediary should alert
him of the risks and consequences of spreading content. The intermediary might turn to users as social actors and raise the following questions: “Are you sure you won’t regret sharing this?” or
“Could this content cause harm to a third party?” Dissemination
could be delayed until the user confirms that he can mindfully
share the content. Similarly, intermediaries might inform users of
the implications of publishing and sharing content and the information’s potential to spread. For example, they might raise questions such as “Do you know that clicking this button exposes the
post to your 1,000 friends?” As studies in a related context show,
this strategy is likely to cause users to internalize the fact that dis394
seminating content can inflict harm, and thereby promote civility

390. See COHEN, supra note 73, at 180 (explaining that platform-based environments incorporate “choice architecture favoring the decisions that the platform or the application
designers want their users to make”).
391. For example, framing relationships in social networks as “friendships,” feedback
mechanisms, and features for sharing content all increase the likelihood an individual will
reaching his threshold for disseminating content.
392. See supra Section I.D.
393. See supra Section I.D (discussing the severe harm of dissemination).
394. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237 (proposing a similar nudge for civility—a “civility check”).
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and help them to avoid engaging in regrettable online dissemina395
tion.
Some intermediaries already inform users of the potential consequences of sharing content, but this is done only after the fact. 396
A better policy would be to address users before dissemination occurs, in order to prevent automatic intuitive sharing from the
397
start. The idea of using nudges to promote reflective thinking
and accountable sharing is starting to gain momentum. For example, Twitter recently began asking people if they are sure that they
want to re-tweet a link if they have not accessed the link themselves. 398 Such a nudge can promote reflective thinking before dissemination.
Nudges, therefore, have great potential to mitigate online
399
harm. As technology advances, intermediaries can use these advances to improve nudges. For example, intermediaries can use artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to conform
the nudge to the content that the user is about to disseminate by
400
identifying specific words in the content. The intermediary can
also function as a social actor, instead of simply sending automatic
messages, by enhancing user awareness of messages and their pos401
sible repercussions.
397F

398F

395. See Wang et al., supra note 380, at 1318–23, 1331 (arguing that designing mechanisms that nudge users to consider the content and context of their online disclosures are
efficient in helping individuals avoid regrettable online disclosures and, thus, enhance their
privacy); John et al., supra note 380.
396. For example, whenever a user tweets, the intermediary informs him that his tweets
will appear in the timelines of his followers. However, this message appears only after dissemination and the “status-quo-bias” reduces the likelihood of ex post facto deletion by the
user. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 34 (explaining that people have a general
tendency to stick with the current situation, this phenomenon is dubbed the “status-quobias”).
397. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 139, at 19–24 (2011); THALER, supra note 373, at
99 (referring to “the planner” who thinks in the long run versus the “doer” who acts instinctively. Nudging accountability in disseminating content may prevent bypassing deliberation
and reduce cognitive biases).
398. See Alex Hern, Twitter Aims to Limit People Sharing Articles They Have Not Read, THE
GUARDIAN (June 11, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jun/11
/twitter-aims-to-limit-people-sharing-articles-they-have-not-read.
399. See HARTZOG, supra note 120.
400. The same strategy intermediaries use to match advertisements to user content also
allows intermediaries to use information on user content and interests, in order to tailor
nudges to users. On intermediary usage of information to match content and advertisements to users, see Julie E. Cohen, The Emergent Limbic Media System, in LIFE AND THE LAW IN
THE ERA OF DATA-DRIVEN AGENCY 60 (2019) (Mireille Hildebrandt & Kieron O’Hara eds.,
2020).
401. WALDMAN, supra note 116, at 141 (expounding on social communication of bots
that motivate users to release privacy protections, by technological design).
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Indeed, social network platforms are starting to use nudges. Fa402
cebook cooperates with fact-checking organizations and informs
individuals before they share fake news that independent websites
and fact checkers have found the information to be false, or at
403
least controversial. Instagram also labels fake news to reduce its
404
dissemination. Twitter followed and added new fact-checking labels to hundreds of tweets. Twitter even used such a label to flag a
post by President Donald Trump, rebutting its accuracy, before,
405
during and even after the 2020 election cycle. In another context, Twitter has also started applying warning messages to tweets
406
that contain misleading information about COVID-19. Yet, using
this strategy to try to refute false rumors that have already been
published and disseminated can backfire. Repeating a falsehood
and adding information in order to refute it, or tagging information as false, only exacerbates the information’s visibility and in407
creases the likelihood that users will believe it. Tagging falsehoods as such might even lead users to assume that content that
was not tagged as false is true, even though it could be completely
408
false.
Moreover, even if exposure to information refuting a falsehood
could mitigate its harm, this strategy can be used only regarding
content that fact checkers have already deemed false or controversial. This usually happens after content has already spread to a

402. See Levi, supra note 36; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 287 (explaining that the
solution of fact checking organizations did not mitigate the problem); see also Van Loo, supra note 294.
403. Nikhil Sonnad, This Is Now What Happens When You Try to Post Fake News on Facebook,
QUARTZ (Mar. 19, 2017), http://bit.ly/2LAuOXw.
404. Stephanie Milot, Instagram Automatically Labels, Hides Fake News, GEEK.COM (Dec. 17,
2019), https://web.archive.org/web/20191217184642/https://www.geek.com/tech
/instagram-automatically-labels-hides-fake-news-1813964/.
405. Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Defying Trump, Twitter Doubles Down on Labeling Tweets,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/technology/trumptwitter-fact-check.html; see also Kim Lyons, Twitter Flags President Trump’s Tweets About BallotCounting, THE VERGE (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/7/21554013
/twitter-flags-president-trumps-tweets-votes-counted-election-pennsylvania; Trump Falsely
Claims Victory on Twitter Just Ahead of Biden Win, THE QUINT (Nov. 7, 2020), www.the
quint.com/news/world/won-by-a-lot-president-trump-falsely-declares-victory-on-twitter-again
(referring to Trump’s misleading tweet: “I won this election by a lot”).
406. See Coronavirus: Twitter Will Label Covid-19 Fake News, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2020),
www.bbc.com/news/technology-52632909.
407. See generally DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 47, at 225 (2007); Pennycook et al., supra note 16.
408. See David M.J. Lazer, Matthew A. Baum, Yochai Benkler, Adam J. Berinsky, Kelly M.
Greenhill, Filippo Menczer, Miriam J. Metzger, Brendan Nyhan, Gordon Pennycook, David
Rothschild, Michael Schudson, Steven A. Sloman, Cass R. Sunstein, Emily A. Thorson, Duncan J. Watts & Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Science of Fake News, 359 SCI. MAG. 1094–96 (2018);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 125 (explaining that trying to refute a falsehood after it has already been published often failed and even exacerbated user commitment to the content of
the rumor).
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wide audience and caused tremendous harm. Furthermore, initiatives by fact checkers to refute false rumors, defamation, and fake
news usually focus on falsehoods about public figures or politicians
and neglects to address statements about “ordinary people.” In
contrast, intermediary nudges for reflective thinking prior to dissemination would apply to all types of false rumors, including rumors about “ordinary people.” This type of nudge does not repeat
the false rumor or exacerbate its visibility or credibility. Such
nudges are neutral to the content that users publish or disseminate
and are expected to mitigate the harm of all types of false rumors.
Thus, this proposed solution is preferable to current policy.
Companies and policy makers are discovering the potential ben409
efits of nudges. In the related context of privacy and data protection, literature has proposed that choice architects design systems
that would generate nudges to enhance informed choices about
sharing information and reflective thinking about the privacy im410
plications of sharing. For example, using nudges to encourage
users to change the privacy setting of their date of birth on their
411
personal profile and share it with fewer people, or using nudges
412
to reduce the sharing of other private information. Empirical
studies have confirmed the efficiency of nudges in privacy protection. For example, researchers found that placing details about the
privacy policy of platforms for commerce on search engines pushes
users to prefer platforms that maintain higher standards of priva413
cy. Scholars recently discovered the potential of this strategy to
414
combat false rumors, defamation, and fake news. Yet, literature
has not held a comprehensive discussion on this related context.
Due to the potential of nudge-based strategies to slow the dissemination of such content, intermediaries should apply this solution to mitigate irresponsible dissemination of falsehoods. At this
junction, the question is how to incentivize intermediaries to incorporate nudges for accountability in dissemination. More broad-

409. SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 97, at 107, 114 (referring to the strategy of asking
simple questions to promote critical thinking, change perspectives and avoid information
and reputation cascades).
410. HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 215–26; Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte &
George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. MAG. 509,
511 (2015).
411. See Egelman et al., supra note 355.
412. Wang et al., supra note 380, at 1334 (found that “privacy nudges can potentially be a
powerful mechanism to help some people avoid unintended disclosures”).
413. See, e.g., Acquisiti et al., supra note 410.
414. See Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, UTAH L. REV. 993,
1014 (2009); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Increasing the Transaction Costs of
Harassment, B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 47 (2015).
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ly, should intermediaries adopt this solution voluntarily, or should
the law obligate them to nudge?
At first glance, it would appear that intermediaries are not likely
to adopt solutions that aspire to reduce dissemination because they
currently profit from it and even use nudges to promote dissemi415
nation. Arguably, legal regulation is preferable to incentives for
voluntary adoption of nudges, meaning the government should
force intermediaries to nudge. A closer look, however, reveals that
this is not always the case. Here, it is important to differentiate between the dissemination of content in general and the spreading
of falsehoods. Indeed, in most cases, intermediaries have no incentive to self-regulate dissemination because they profit from it. With
respect to falsehoods, though, the situation is different. Many intermediaries are concerned by “the potential business, moral, and
instrumental costs” of falsehoods and see these falsehoods “as a po416
tential threat to [their] profit[s].” Other intermediaries self417
regulate falsehoods due to a sense of corporate responsibility, to
418
enhance their social standing, or as a preventive measure to shy
away from murky legal areas and diminish the likelihood of claims
against them. Due to the potential benefits, many intermediaries
419
already self-regulate dissemination of falsehoods. Nudges for accountability focus on offensive content and do not purport to reduce dissemination generally. Therefore, intermediaries might
420
have an intrinsic motivation to adopt this solution.
In addition, other incentives can be created. For instance, fiduciary intermediaries could grant a stamp of approval (such as a
421
trust mark) to intermediaries that promote user accountability.
415. See supra Section I.C and accompanying notes (describing strategies that intermediaries utilize to enhance social sharing).
416. Lavi, supra note 54, at 937; see also Thomas E. Kadri, Networks of Empathy, 4 UTAH L.
REV. 1088 (2020) (“[P]erhaps because the design will create goodwill and help to retain a
company’s customers or because it will entice more people (including victims) to start using
their products.”).
417. See Klonick, supra note 294, at 1627; Citron & Norton, supra note 108, at 1455–56
(noting that voluntary regulation can be justified by doctrines of corporate law, which allow
managers to consider public interests).
418. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN; supra note 354, at 35 (referring to a “social license to
operate”).
419. See Citron & Norton, supra note 108, at 1454 (discussing MySpace as an example of
voluntary regulation by a mediator due to economic considerations and voluntarily removal
of offensive content in order to attract children). Yet, in most cases, self-regulation focuses
on content moderation and ex ante measurement and does not fulfil the promise of ex ante
regulation by design.
420. See Klonick, supra note 294, at 1606–07, 1626–30 (explaining that despite immunity
of intermediaries from liability in the United States, intermediaries voluntarily self-regulate
due to corporate responsibility and to create a more pleasant environment for users that
would make their platform more attractive and enhance profits).
421. In our context, ISOC (Internet Society) can function as a fiduciary intermediary. See
Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNET SOCIETY (May 2019), http://www.isoc.org/isoc/general.
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This might improve their image, attract more users, and therefore
enhance advertising profits and contribute to the intrinsic motivation to prevent dissemination of offensive content. Of course, illicit
intermediaries exist. Such intermediaries encourage distribution of
offensive content and profit particularly from its publication and
422
dissemination. These intermediaries lack any economic or moral
incentive to adopt the proposed solution. In such cases, legal regulation is also not an efficient solution. As studies in related contexts
prove, when a party opposes the policy behind the nudge, obligating it to adopt the policy is inefficient and the party is likely to
nudge unconvincingly, by steering users away from it, using dark
423
patterns, and manipulating nudge-forcing rules. Thus, mandates
impose expensive costs without reaping any benefits.
In summary, nudging to promote reflective thinking is not a
perfect solution. It can, however, reduce impulsive dissemination
by neutrals and skeptics, discourage impulsive postings, and slow
down the dissemination of falsehoods. It improves upon current
policy, which does not disincentivize these types of propagators.
Incentivizing intermediaries to adopt this solution voluntarily is
superior to legal regulation, since legal regulation is less flexible
and might infringe on the intermediary’s freedom to conduct their
business. The lack of flexibility would also likely have negative consequences for efficiency and innovation. When the intermediary

Trust marks are defined as “[e]lectronic labels or visual representations indicating that an emerchant has demonstrated its conformity to standards regarding security, privacy, and
business practice.” See EUROPEAN CONSUMER CTRS.’S NETWORK, TRUST MARKS REPORT 2013:
“CAN I TRUST THE TRUST MARK?” (2013), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files
/trust_mark_report_2013_en.pdf (discussing how trust marks can be used to protect consumers).
422. The business models of these intermediaries are based on dissemination of sensational rumors, which may in turn draw more users. See Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). In addition, some intermediaries encourage
users to share negative reviews and directly profit from defamation through Corporate Advocacy Programs, which purport to assist in resolving the posted complaints. They charge
victims money for removing the offensive content. See, e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005); Vo Group v. Opinion Corp.,
No. 8758/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 22, 2012); see also Lavi, supra note 53; Kim, supra note 414, at
1045; Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online Harassment,
32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 384 (2009).
423. For example, the intermediary can use small letters or cumbersome language. See
Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1200–01 (2013)
(discussing instances in which a party stands to lose revenue due to a nudge—such as a bank
and automatic enrollment in anti-overdraft programs—and thus makes an effort to steer
users away from its influence). On dark patterns in a related context, see Ari Ezra Waldman,
Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 619–20 (2019); Ari
Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox,” CURRENT ISSUES
PSYCH. (forthcoming 2020); Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark
Patterns, 12 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2020) (expanding on dark patterns in the context of privacy and data protection).
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lacks intrinsic motivation to adopt this solution, it will likely bypass
regulation. Therefore, a voluntary solution is preferred.
C. Nudges for Accountable Dissemination of Information:
Addressing Limitations and Objections
The solution of nudges for accountable dissemination is promising; however, there are certainly several potential objections to this
framework that must be addressed. First, general scholarly criticism
of nudges should be addressed. Nudges have raised many contro424
versies, objections, and ethical concerns in scholarly work. It has
been argued that nudges are not libertarian paternalism but actual
425
paternalism in disguise; they manipulate choices and should be
426
constrained. In light of this criticism, one could argue that it is
inappropriate to adopt such a controversial nudge-based solution.
The general controversy regarding nudges is beyond the scope
of this Article. Indeed, some nudges can be manipulative and un427
ethical. However, as far as the proposed nudges are concerned,
most objections are marginal because, in this context, nudges are
not manipulative and can even promote individual autonomy.
Thus, those who object to nudges in general may agree that the
nudges proposed here should not be constrained. Intermediaries
will influence decisions to share content by raising questions that
provoke users’ reflective thinking and, in turn, prevent impulsive
dissemination. As empirical studies have shown, individuals sup-

424. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging (Harv. L. Sch. Discussion Paper, No. 806,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526341 (weighing arguments
for and against nudge-based strategies).
425. See Thaler et al., supra note 374 (arguing that the idea of libertarian paternalism is
both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions); see also Henry Farrell &
Cosma Shalizi, ‘Nudge’ Policies Are Another Name for Coercion, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 2, 2011),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228376-500-nudge-policies-are-another-namefor-coercion (arguing that nudges are paternalistic coercion).
426. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237 (referring to objections against
nudge-based strategies and emphasizing that there is no completely “neutral” design). However, other scholars differentiate between “a given context that accidentally influences behavior and a choice architect who intentionally tries to alter behavior by fiddling with contexts.”
See, e.g., Guldborg Hansen & Andreas Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice: A
Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach to Behavior Change in Public Policy, EUR. J.
RISK REG. 3, 10(2013); T. M. Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341
(2013).
427. There are nudges that apply to intuitive thinking and might be manipulative and
objectionable. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 17, 82; Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen
Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1,
19 (2019) (discussing the relationship between nudges and manipulation in an online context). Yet, nudges can be transparent and promote reflective thinking. See SUNSTEIN, supra
note 375, at 17.
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port this type of nudge, which enhances their self-control and
429
seeks to prevent impulsive dissemination. These nudges do not
aim to affect subconscious or unconscious processing of information. Therefore, they should not be considered manipulation or
430
an objectionable interference with autonomy.
The proposed nudges may also counter the influence of choice
architecture, which promotes dissemination in general, appeals to
intuitive thinking, and leads individuals to regret sharing content
431
after the fact. These nudges are transparent and help individuals
correct mental shortcuts to achieve legitimate objectives. In fact,
432
they promote autonomy and self-governance, and do not insult
433
individual dignity. This type of nudge respects individual goals
434
Hence, the general criticism
and promotes public welfare.
435
against nudges does not undermine the proposed solution.
Second, it can be argued that the nudge solution is inefficient.
Even if most intermediaries adopt the nudges for accountable dissemination, nudges will influence only some propagators and disseminators. Indeed, nudges are expected to be useful in dissuading
altruistic propagators, who believe the information they intend to
publish is true, from publishing the information. Nudges are also
likely to be useful in dissuading neutrals, who have no inclination
in favor of or against the information and skeptics, who have higher thresholds for the dissemination of content, and have the potential to break the “follow the herd” mentality. However, nudges
will not stop malicious propagators who publish offensive content

428. See generally Sunstein, supra note 378 at 184 (discussing how there is greater support
for nudges that appeal to a person’s capacity for reflective and deliberate choice than for
nudges that seem to affect the subconscious); Cass R. Sunstein, Lucia A. Reisch & Micha
Kaiser, Trusting Nudges? Lessons from an International Survey, 26 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1417, 1421
(2018).
429. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 139.
430. See Cass R. Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 213, 217 (2016);
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 53–54 (explaining that nudges that promote welfare, autonomy, dignity, and selfgovernance are ethical).
431. For instance, identifying a relationship on Facebook as a “friendship” appeals to
intuitive thinking and enhanced sharing. See supra Section I.C and accompanying notes;
Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1179–81. On the potential of defaults that are considered
nudges to promote autonomy, see generally Cass Sunstein, Autonomy by Default, 11 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 1 (2016); and SUNSTEIN, supra note 430, which refers to educative nudges that
lead individuals to make better choices for themselves.
432. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 430, at 72, 74–77; Susser et al., supra note 427, at 21 (explaining that lies are manipulative but that the proposed nudges aim to correct cognitive
biases and mitigate the harm of lies and falsehoods, and thus they are not manipulative).
433. E.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 430, at 60 (giving the example of the GPS that helps individuals navigate without insulting anyone’s dignity).
434. See id. at 53–54 (discussing how governments use nudges to increase welfare).
435. See id. at 53–77 (explaining that nudges that promote welfare, autonomy, and selfgovernance are not manipulative).
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436

simply to inflict injury. They are not likely to dissuade narrowly
self-interested propagators and have very little influence on generally self-interested propagators from publishing falsehoods. In addition, receptives, who have a low threshold for accepting and
adopting information, may continue to spread false rumors, defa437
mation, and fake news despite nudges.
Moreover, nudges have no influence on bots that disseminate
rumors and operate by technological code. These Artificial Intelligence entities are usually operated by narrowly self-interested indi438
viduals who program the code to publish and echo specific false439
hoods. In order to allow falsehoods to spread, the operators of
bots are likely to program the algorithm to automatically signal
that they “agree” to publish or share the content despite the in440
termediary’s alerts.
Indeed, nudges are likely to influence only part of the network,
and yet, this solution can still reduce and slow down dissemination
of false rumors, defamation, and fake news within large parts of a
network. Thus, fewer informational cascades would be expected.
As explained in Part I above, the more times a post is shared, the
more individuals reach their threshold of belief and disseminate it
further. Although nudges influence only part of the network, they
can reduce the publishing and sharing of falsehoods and can slow
down their dissemination, therefore, minimizing the gravity of the
harm falsehoods inflict.
Truly, nudges cannot influence automatic algorithms and bots
that disseminate and share falsehoods. Such algorithms pose chal441
lenges to the protection of reputations and the public interest,
and it might be advisable to adopt additional mechanisms or spe-

436. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 13.
437. Due to the receptive’s prior disposition in favor of the rumor, they have a low-level
threshold. Therefore, a nudge may not suffice to dissuade them from spreading it.
438. On the motivations to publish and spread rumors, see supra Section I.A.1.
439. Engineers who serve companies and stakeholders control the parameters at the
base of the algorithms ex ante. See Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big
Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2017) (“When we criticize algorithms, we are really criticizing the programming, or the data, or their interaction. But equally important, we are also
criticizing the use to which they are being put by the humans who programmed the algorithms, collected the data, or employed the algorithms and the data to perform particular
tasks.”).
440. Massive Networks of Fake Accounts Found on Twitter, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), https:
//bbc.com/news/technology-38724082. For more information on Twitter bots during the
2016 U.S. elections, see Philip N. Howard, Samuel Woolley & Ryan Calo, Algorithms, Bots, and
Political Communication in the US 2016 Election: The Challenge of Automated Political Communication for Election Law and Administration, 15 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 81 (2018).
441. See Lazer et al., supra note 408, at 1095 (discussing how dissemination of fake news
can erode individuals’ trust in reputable news outlets and make it harder for people to obtain truthful information).
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442

cific regulations pertaining to bots. Many intermediaries have intrinsic incentives to narrow down the activity of bots on their platforms because in many cases bots fail to comply with the platform’s
terms of service and distort the public discourse. For example,
many intermediaries already act to reduce activities of fake bots by
443
using algorithms. Moreover, bots are less likely to be involved in
all types of dissemination of falsehoods. Rather, they focus on
444
commercial entities, public figures, and public representatives.
Dissemination of falsehoods about such entities has implications
beyond the direct parties. In such cases, it is likely that local and
state law enforcement will get involved and invest resources in
identifying the parties that are directly responsible for the dissemi445
nation. Civil society organizations are also likely to be involved in
446
detecting bots and to function as watchdogs who report bots to
442. For example, one proposal is to impose a duty on paid influencers to carry a disclaimer informing users that they are paid, and the source of payment. See BENKLER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 371–75; Honest Ads Act, H.R. 4077, 115th Cong. § 1989 (2017) (advocating
for disclosure obligations by those who are paid to advertise things to the public). The trigger for the Honest Ads Act was Russian intervention in the U.S. 2016 elections and the need
to ensure that electioneering communities are not funded by foreign nationals. Ellen P.
Goodman & Lyndsey Wajert, The Honest Ads Act Won’t End Social Media Disinformation, but It’s
a Start (Nov. 2, 2017), (unpublished manuscript), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3064451.
443. In the context of extremist content, Facebook is using artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning to combat harmful content more efficiently. Platforms are expected
to find better ways to combat fake news with the development of this technology. See, e.g.,
Julia Fioretti, Pressured in Europe, Facebook Details Removal of Terrorism Content, REUTERS (June
15, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/pressured-in-europe-facebookdetails-removal-of-terrorism-content/. It should be noted that bots are becoming more sophisticated and are learning to obscure indication as automated entities, in an arms race
with intermediaries, which are improving their strategies to detect them. For example, the
intermediary can reduce the participation of nonhuman software by using CAPTCHA
(Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) and some
technologies allow intermediaries to detect and remove “likes” that are generated by “automated software programs, malware, and hacked accounts.” See Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Man
Posting as Ordinary Consumer: The Essential Role of Self-Regulation and Industry Ethics on Decreasing Deceptive Online Consumer Rating and Reviews, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
462, 504 (2013); FINN BRUNTON, HELEN NISSENBAUM: OBFUSCATION – A USER’S GUIDE FOR
PRIVACY AND PROTEST 40 (2015).
444. See Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 988, 995–
1002 (2019) (outlining a taxonomy of three main types of bots: commercial , political and
creative). Arguably, a person is less likely to invest efforts and code algorithms to echo a
negative falsehood on private ‘ordinary’ people. Rather, it seems more reasonable that bot
operators focus on spreading information on commercial entities and public figures. It can
be assumed that creative bots are less likely to spread defamation on private people, because
they operate for creative purposes.
445. Law enforcers are already investigating the activity of bots that influence elections.
See, e.g., Report: FBI Investigating Russian Operatives Using Bots to Spread Stories from Breitbart, RT,
Info Wars, MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.mediamatters.org/breitbart
-news/report-fbi-investigating-russian-operatives-using-bots-spread-stories-breitbart-rt.
446. See, e.g., Press Release, Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford Experts Launch New
Online Tool to Help Fight Disinformation (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news
/releases/oxford-experts-launch-new-online-tool-to-help-fight-disinformation/ (“Researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, have launched ‘The ComProp
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social network operators and law enforcers. Thus, market forces
and the law are likely to narrow the gap in self-regulation by nudges and reduce dissemination of falsehoods by bots.
Third, the efficiency of nudges can decrease over time. Arguably, users will get used to nudges, learn to ignore them, and click
automatically on the button that allows them to publish and disseminate information without paying any attention to the intermediary’s alerts.
This does not undermine the proposed strategy. The use of
nudges can still slow down dissemination of falsehoods relative to
448
dissemination on platforms without nudges. In addition, the
costs of nudges in the digital ecosystem are lower than in a brickand-mortar infrastructure, allowing their benefits to outweigh their
costs. Furthermore, technology advancements could preserve the
449
efficiency of nudges. The intermediary could learn to identify
users that consistently ignore nudges and immediately click and
share and develop stronger nudges that are more likely to influ450
ence them. For example, the intermediary might increase the diversity of nudges, personalize them, and make them more relevant
to the specific content that the user intends to publish or share.
Thus, the intermediary might be able to preserve the efficiency of
the nudge over time.
Fourth, nudges can result in a chilling effect and suppress the
motivation to publish and disseminate legitimate expression, in
particular among minorities that might avoid expressing ideas that
are outside of the consensus. This argument is valid, yet the nudge
strategy brings about a better balance between freedom of speech,
dignity, and public interest in an era of vast digital dissemination.
Although nudges have the potential to chill speech, they do not
prohibit anyone from speaking and the choice to speak remains in
the hands of every individual. Nudges might cause minorities and
other disadvantaged groups in society to self-censor legitimate expressions that are outside of the consensus, but nudges can also

Navigator,’ a new online resource guide which aims to help civil society groups better understand and respond to the problem of disinformation.”).
447. See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 42.
448. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237–38 (proposing the use of nudges
to enhance civility among individuals online).
449. Cf. Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 157, 184 (2019) (suggesting that, in the context of intermediaries and advertiser influences, as consumers get used to strategies of influence and learn to ignore them,
companies may develop new ways of influencing consumers).
450. See, e.g., Adrian L. Jessup Scheneider & T.C. Nicholas Graham, Pushing Without
Breaking: Nudging Exergame Players While Maintaining Immersion, 2015 I.E.E.E. GAMES ENT.
MEDIA CONF., Oct. 14–16, 2015, at 1, 1–8 (2015) (discussing the use of progressively severe
nudges in response to players who ignore nudges in the related context of exergames).
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mitigate potential harm to minorities and disadvantaged groups
when falsehoods and defamation are disseminated against them.
Minorities and disadvantaged groups suffer from harmful expres451
sion more than other sectors of the population. Thus, nudges
can narrow social gaps and improve protection of the human
rights of the disadvantaged as potential victims.
D. Efficient Removal Ex Post Facto
A common remedy for dissemination of falsehoods is ex post facto
removal. This remedy, however, does not solve the problem of disseminating falsehoods. A victim whose name has been tainted
would have to indicate each and every virtual setting of a falsehood
or defamation in order to completely remove the content and ensure it would not be found and widely disseminated again. Civil society organizations might also find it difficult to report on every location of fake news and protect the public interest. Due to the vast
dissemination of content within social networks, complete removal
may be impossible.
This problem calls for a solution that enables the removal of
falsehoods and defamatory remarks from all settings in which they
reside. Unlike the previous solution, which focused on behavioral
influences of architecture, this solution focuses on the code itself,
452
the constraints it constitutes, and the possibilities it affords. One
possibility is to design the code to allow the dissemination of a
message to only a limited number of recipients, thereby slowing
down the dissemination of falsehoods, and even preventing them
453
from reaching the tipping point and going viral. Yet this solution
could hinder the dissemination of useful, newsworthy information.
454
A preferable solution would be efficient removal ex post facto. Intermediaries that integrate features that allow for the sharing of
content within their platforms should also allow the efficient removal of harmful content from any profiles and locations to which
the content was disseminated by the removal of the original

451. See, e.g., Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media
Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L REV. 592, 596–601 (2015).
452. See LESSIG, supra note 342, at 123–25.
453. See, e.g., Jacob Kastrenakes, WhatsApp Limits Message Forwarding in Fight Against Misinformation, THE VERGE (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/21/18191455
/whatsapp-forwarding-limit-five-messages-misinformation-battle (discussing WhatsApp’s limit on the number of times a message can be forwarded).
454. For a previous article in which I discuss this solution, see Lavi, supra note 32.
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455

post. Intermediaries can do so, by integrating in the code of their
456
platforms features such as an “embedded link.”
“Embedded links allow users to import external web content
and present it in their profiles.” 457 Removal of an original post with
an embedded link would result in deletion of all replications disseminated by the “share” button upon complaint from the victim, a
judicial decision, or flagging practices. As every replication of the
post that was created by the share button is connected to the original publication, even reports on a replication are likely to lead to
flagging the original post as inappropriate. Alternatively, intermediaries could use “technology that allows data tethering, which
458
changes the shared content according to the source.” The intermediary can integrate these features in the code, architecture, or
protocol of their platforms at the stage of design. This technology
459
is in fact used today; “however, choice architecture is value-laden
and reflects a particular set of preferences that should not be taken
460
for granted.” The values behind technology can influence the
461
way it is used. The design of the platform and code can make in462
formation more visible or more obscure. It can create an incen463
tive to upload and share more content almost automatically or,
by contrast, encourage reflective thinking before sharing posts.
Similarly, design can either make it easy to share content at the
click of a button or do exactly the opposite by increasing the costs
of dissemination. For example, intermediaries can make it difficult
to share content by designing architecture that allows dissemination only by copying-and-pasting of content to every recipient. Alternatively, intermediaries can limit the number of recipients with

455. Id. at 2670.
456. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2670–71. For further discussion of the context of intellectual
property, see Toby Headdon, An Epilogue to Svensson: The Same Old New Public and the Worms
that Didn’t Turn, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 662 (2014).
457. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671.
458. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671 (citing JONES, supra note 243 at 187 (explaining that
technology can allow every copied piece of data to be tethered to its master copy)).
459. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
460. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671.
461. See generally Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 110, at 701 (explaining that the design of technology is an effective mean of control); HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 44–45 (explaining that design is political; it can suppress the dissemination of personal information
and promote privacy, or promote values of freedom of information).
462. For example, the design and architecture of the platform can make it difficult to
find information on users as it can make information more obscure, to increase the costs of
finding information on users and enhance privacy. In contrast, design can enhance access to
information, reduce the costs of finding it, and infringe on user privacy. Design can also
include dark patterns and obscure objectionable terms of service. See id. at 272.
463. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 130, at 11 (explaining that “[I]t’s rapidly
becoming easier to design technologies that nudge us to go on auto-pilot and accept the
cheap pleasure that comes from minimal thinking . . . .”).
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whom the user can share information with the click of a button or
allow efficient removal of the content shared ex post. By designing
efficient removal mechanisms, removal of the original content can
lead to widespread removal from all profiles. Every intermediary
464
designs its platform in a way that promotes its own objectives.
Some intermediaries tune their sharing mechanisms so that users
share a link to the original post. For instance, “a click on the
‘share’ button on Facebook or the ‘re-tweet’ button on Twitter
links to the original content and embeds the shared content into
465
the profiles of the disseminator and his friends.” Yet, there are
different business models and attitudes regarding content moderation and removal of offensive content. Alongside intermediaries
with an intrinsic motivation to moderate content out of a sense of
466
social responsibility, or in order to enhance their social standing
467
and attract a greater audience, there are platforms that profit
from offensive sensational content, such as gossip websites or extreme racist alt-right websites. Such websites have no intrinsic in468
centive to design technology for efficient removal of content.
Moreover, even mainstream media giants do not share a uniform policy regarding removal of offensive content. For example,
in the related context of incitement to terrorism, “Twitter used to
take a laissez-faire approach to terrorist content and avoided re469
moving it even [when] it was made aware of the content,” while
470
Facebook made efforts to remove the content upon knowledge.
Twitter changed its policy only when regulation of extremist
471
speech became a real possibility. Similarly, different intermediar-

464. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671. Designs, for example, can promote privacy protection or infringe on it. Intermediaries use the design by including dark patterns and obscuring objectionable terms of service. See HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 272; Nancy Kim, Website
Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS 383, 402–03 (2012).
465. Lavi, supra note 31, at 2671.
466. See Klonick, supra note 294.
467. Citron & Norton, supra note 107, at 1453–57 (discussing MySpace as an example of
an intermediary’s voluntary regulation due to economic considerations and voluntarily removal of offensive content in order to attract children).
468. See, e.g., Emma Grey Ellis, Gab, the Alt-Right’s Very Own Twitter, Is the Ultimate Filter
Bubble, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/gab-alt-rights-twitterultimate-filter-bubble/; MARANTZ, supra note 39, at 5–6; Lavi, supra note 78, at 15.
469. Lavi, supra note 138, at 498.
470. Nina I. Brown, Fight Terror, Not Twitter: Insulating Social Media from Material Support
Claims, 37 LOY. LA. ENT. L. REV. 1, 10 (2016).
471. See Michelle Roter, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: Imposing a Duty to Take
down Terrorist Incitement on Social Media, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1391–1392, 1399 (2017)
(referring to an official statement from the White House encouraging social media platforms to block more terrorists from using their services and discussing Twitter’s policy). For
information on Twitter’s policy, see Combating Violent Extremism, TWITTERBLOG (Feb. 5,
2015), blog.twitter.com/en_us/a/2016/combating-violent-extremism.html. See generally
Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE
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ies have different attitudes towards moderation of posts that incite
violence. For example, while Twitter hid President Trump’s May
2020 tweet “glorifying violence,” Facebook avoided hiding or re472
moving it. Thus, legislative changes regarding efficient removal
mechanisms can provide an incentive for removal even when the
intermediary lacks intrinsic motivation to mitigate the harm of offensive content.
Unlike the previous solution of nudges, which focused on arranging the decision-making context, this solution applies directly
to the code itself and the possibilities it affords and focuses on the
result (efficient removal). Therefore, there are fewer opportunities
for intermediaries that lack intrinsic motivation to evade implementation. In this case, a combination of legal and technological
measures is preferable to voluntary self-regulation.
From a normative perspective, as technologies advance and the
moderation and influence of intermediaries on the flow of information become a fundamental aspect of any platform, it is high
time to rethink their legal obligations. Scholars have proposed that
the law should refine the immunity regime granted to intermediar473
ies in § 230. Some have asserted that the law should adopt a version of a “notice-and-takedown” regime for social network plat474
forms. Yet, a condition should be added to this safe haven.
Accordingly, the safe haven should apply only upon efficient removal of offensive content shared via publish, share, or re-tweet
buttons. Conditioning the safe haven on efficient removal
measures can mitigate injury to victims since they would not need
to point out every location where the falsehood was shared in order to remove it. Instead, the victim could send a “notice-andtakedown” notification to the intermediary regarding the original
post only. Taking down the original post would lead to removal of
all replications that were created using the share button.
Efficient “removal of offensive content might [also] be achieved
475
even without amending [§] 230,” by adopting other formal reguDAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2018) (referring to changes in policies of social media platforms
adopted to stave off the threat of European regulation).
472. Bond, supra note 307.
473. 47 U.S.C. § 230. For scholarly proposals to narrow down immunity, see Citron &
Wittes, supra note 174, at 420; Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just
Backpage, Revisiting Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 470–71 (2018); Danielle
Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT INST. COLUM. U., 4–5 (Apr. 6, 2018); and Citron, supra note 114, at 1074.
474. See supra Part II for a discussion on this regime. See also Citron & Wittes, supra note
473, at 470 (“Sustained failure to remove an account despite repeated notifications . . .
might well strip the company of immunity in a specific case.”); Lavi, supra note 52, at 930–31
(arguing that a version of notice-and-takedown regime is optimal for regulating secondary
liability of intermediaries on social network platforms).
475. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2669.
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lations. Such regulations might impose an obligation to design efficient mechanisms to remove replications of unwanted posts along
with the original post. In many cases, the law in the United States
allows victims of alleged defamation to file legal suits against the
476
person that published the original post. A defamation suit is pos477
sible if the plaintiff uses his real name and can be identified.
Many website platforms allow the original publisher of posts or
comments to remove them. The publisher may then remove his
posts or comments at the request of the victim, following a direct
lawsuit filed by the victim, or if a court orders the defendant to do
478
so. Such regulation would lead to removal of all replications
along with the publisher’s removal of the original post.
Moreover, in spite of the immunity outlined by § 230, “some
courts may order the intermediary to remove the offensive state479
ments” following a ruling that the statements were defamatory. A
lower court in California already extended an order to remove defamatory online reviews to the intermediary. Even though the Supreme Court of California reversed this ruling, extending an order
to remove harmful content to third-party platforms can be adopted
480
in other states. Moreover, the practice of enjoining non-liable
481
platforms to defamation lawsuits can develop. This may allow efficient removal of falsehoods when the publisher does not appear
at a court hearing or refuses to take statements down.
“This solution mitigates [the] harm of the victim, enhances the
publisher’s control over content, and allows him to remove the
482
content ex post facto.” It reduces administrative costs and promotes efficiency while preserving freedom of expression and avoid-

476. See, e.g., Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471, 475 (6th Cir. 2019) (dismissing claim because the defendant added question marks to his defamatory tweets, making it not actionable); see also Lavi, supra note 47, at 2669; Hunt, supra note 19, at 560–62 (reviewing defamation lawsuits regarding libelous statements posted on Twitter).
477. Many social network platforms, including Facebook, require users to construct a
profile that reflects their real identity (“real-name policy”) and use their offline names when
interacting within the platform. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/terms (last modified Jan. 30, 2015); Lavi, supra note 32, at 2669.
478. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2669.
479. Id. at 2670.
480. Id.; see, e.g., Hassel v. Bird, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203 (Ct. App. 2016) (granting default
judgment and injunctive relief to a lawyer who sued Yelp for a defamatory review), rev’d, 420
P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018); see also Eric Goldman, The California Supreme Court Didn’t Ruin Section
230 (Today)—Hassell v. Bird, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 2, 2018), https://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2018/07/the-california-supreme-court-didnt-ruin-section-230-todayhassell-v-bird.htm.
481. For a proposal of enjoining non liable platforms and allowing courts to grant injunctions of removal directed at the platforms, see Maayan Perel, Enjoining Non-Liable Platforms, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30–41 (2020).
482. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2672.
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ing disproportionate infringement on the intermediary’s right to
conduct a business.
The concept of a legal obligation for intermediaries to implement efficient removal technology at the design stage of the platform, together with defamation suits to remove the content, might
mitigate harm mainly in cases of negative falsehoods against private individuals because the standard of liability is lower relative to
483
the standard in defamation suits of public-figures. Yet, in cases of
severe fake news against public figures, state and local law enforcement authorities could be involved and might order the re484
moval of fake news. In such cases, an efficient removal mechanism can increase the likelihood of achieving better results in the
removal of fake news.
E. Efficient Removal Ex Post Facto: Addressing Limitations and
Objections
First, it can be argued that the solution of efficient removal of
shared content is insufficient because only content that was disseminated using the platform’s sharing feature buttons would be re485
moved. Users would still be able to copy false or defamatory posts
and paste them elsewhere on the platform without using any of the
486
platform’s built-in sharing features. These replications would
remain on the platform even if the original post is removed, thus
undermining the efficiency of the proposed solution.
This argument underlines a genuine weakness of the solution.
In contrast to clicking a button, however, copying and pasting content elsewhere on the platform is cumbersome, and such a manual
sharing is not automatic. Thus, while the efficient removal of content ex post facto is not a perfect solution, it will likely reduce the
487
reputational harm of victims of falsehoods.

483. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), the U.S. Supreme
court held that malice must be proven rather than presumed in cases involving the alleged
defamation of public officials. In contrast, the Court has held that a private-figure plaintiff
must show, at a minimum, that the defendant was negligent in verifying the allegedly defamatory false claim; thereby it is much more difficult for a public figure to win a defamation lawsuit. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
484. States (or supranational entities like the E.U.) are trying to regulate key players that
shape the internet in order to influence them to design infrastructure to control the content that users post and disseminate. This is already happening in the context of terrorist
content and fake news and incitement to terror. See Michal Lavi, supra note 141, at 506;
Balkin, supra note 332.
485. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2673.
486. See id.
487. See id. at 2670–71.
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Moreover, with the advance of technology, market forces are
488
likely to bridge the gap in regulation. Social media giants like Facebook and Twitter can cooperate and share unique digital fingerprints that are assigned to videos or photos containing extreme
defamation, false rumors, or unambiguously fake news and that
489
have been removed from one of their websites. This system allows other intermediaries to identify the same offensive content on
their platforms and remove it even if the user who shared it did not
490
use the share button. Intermediaries already share digital fingerprints that allow their counterparts to identify replications of most
offensive content and remove content in related contexts such as
491
child pornography and incitement to terrorism. These detection
tools, however, are currently flawed and cannot properly interpret
the context of expressions. Inaccurate interpretation of context
492
can result in over-removal that would chill legitimate content.
Therefore, the law should not obligate intermediaries to use these
tools, and it should be an intermediary’s choice to use them voluntarily. “[R]emoval of all replications of text-based [posts or comments] should not be used to automatically prevent the upload[ing] of content” and should be used narrowly only for
493
absolute falsehoods and identical replications. It should only be
used for detection once the offensive content has already been

488. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1799 (“ ‘ISPs and social networks with millions of postings a day cannot plausibly respond to complaints of abuse immediately, let
alone within a day or two,’ yet ‘they may be able to deploy technologies to detect content
previously deemed unlawful.’ ”).
489. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2673.
490. For further discussion on such technology and its uses, see Rafal-Kuchta, The
Hash—A Computer File’s Digital Fingerprint, NEWTECH.LAW (Oct. 9, 2017), https://newtech.law
/en/the-hash-a-computer-files-digital-fingerprint; Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media
Compliance Programs and the War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 79–81 (2017);
Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1955–58 (2019); and Klonick, supra
note 297, at 2429–30 (“Though there have recently been steps forward in using artificial intelligence to screen for things like extremism and hate speech, the vast majority of this system works by matching the uploaded content against a database of already known illegal or
impermissible content using what is known as ‘hash technology.’ ”). It should be noted that
this technology is less efficient in removing replications of text-based content, which require
more sensitivity to context, rather than pictures.
491. See generally Fioretti, supra note 443.
492. See Citron, supra note 282, at 1057–58 (referring to the possible chilling effect of
digital fingerprints, especially if intermediaries adopt it in the shadow of law in order to
avoid regulation); KELLER, supra note 235, at 23–26 (noting that the filters might not be sufficiently context-sensitive in determining whether content is legal).
493. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2674; see also, e.g., Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶37 (Oct. 3, 2019) (discussing removal of content
previously declared unlawful). The ambiguity of equivalence can lead to removal of legitimate content such as parody and satire. To prevent this consequence, intermediaries should
be encouraged to use technological tools only to remove identical content to unlawful content.
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494

Furthermore, human oversight
published on the platform.
should be incorporated to prevent platforms from removing legit495
imate content.
Second, it can be argued that imposing an obligation on intermediaries to embed efficient removal in the design of the platform’s code may lead to a more extensive chilling effect when this
obligation is combined with a regular “notice-and-takedown” regime or an immunity regime. This solution may lead to the removal of legitimate comments on the original post as a by-product of
its removal. Arguably, this solution disrupts the balance between
protection of reputation and freedom of expression and results in
a disproportionate chilling effect. Indeed, the proposed solution can
exacerbate the removal of legitimate content. A closer look, however, reveals that this balance is still maintained because dissemination of offensive content also exacerbates harm to reputation.
Moreover, removal occurs ex post facto, meaning that the content
receives exposure until the victim complains. Removal may be requested only after a while or may not be requested at all. Thus, the
potential chilling effect remains proportionate.
Third, it can be argued that imposing legal obligations on intermediaries to embed efficient removal mechanisms to their code
might result in a chilling effect on developing advanced technological features for sharing content and other types of innovation,
496
which is an undesirable outcome. This outcome is unlikely, however, because social network intermediaries profit from features
that facilitate content sharing. These mechanisms allow interpersonal communication and enhance participation and advertising
profits. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis would incentivize intermediaries to continue developing innovative content-sharing features
alongside implementation of the proposed code-based solution to
attract more users and garner more profits. Concerns that incentives to implement code-based solutions might hinder future innovation are also unwarranted. The proposed solution does not obligate intermediaries that embed content sharing features to prefer

494. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2674.
495. Id.; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 98–100; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS OF AUTOMATED SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 4 (2017)
(“Today’s tools for automating social media content analysis have limited ability to parse the
nuanced meaning of human communication, or to detect the intent or motivation of the
speaker. . .”); FILIPPO RASO, HANNAH HILLIGOSS, VIVEK KRISHNAMURTHY, CHRISTOPHER
BAVITZ & KIMBERLY LEVIN, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & HUMAN
RIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES & RISKS (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3259344.
496. Scholarly work indicates a linkage between lenient liability regimes and innovation.
See ANUPAN CHANDER, THE SILVER SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD TOGETHER
IN COMMERCE 57 (2013); Chander, supra note 186, at 667–69.
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one technology over another. The focus of the conditioned safe
haven is on efficient removal. This solution allows flexibility with
respect to the technology at use. Thus, the risk of hindering innovation is relatively low.
Fourth, it can be argued that imposing an obligation to encode
efficient removal mechanisms can be abused to undermine social
campaigns. This regime risks removal of all content that elicits
complaints, even if it is not false. “The chilling effect of this system
[might result in] a veto power granted to anyone who has an inter497
est [in] silenc[ing] speech, including legitimate criticism.” Removing all replications along with the original post is likely to
make it more difficult to reveal offensive behavior that infringes on
individual rights and the public interest, such as sexual harassment
498
or corruption. Even without amending § 230 and outlining a
“notice-and-takedown” regime, filing an action against the original
publisher or warning that failure to remove the post would lead to
a lawsuit, might lead to removal of the post. Embedding efficient
removal mechanisms in the code would censor all replications of
the post that were shared via the share button even if the post and
the replications were legitimate, for example, posts and replications that benefit from legal defenses to defamation. This may infringe on freedom of speech and the search for truth.
Efficient removal mechanisms can be abused to silence social
campaigns and movements that promote the public interest, however, even social campaigns can at times be abused to spread false
499
allegations and rumors when they go viral. Due to the immense
harm caused by viral dissemination of false allegations and rumors,
efficient removal mechanisms are of particular importance. Indeed, removing all replications of a shared post may exacerbate
the chilling effect when legitimate posts are removed. Yet, viral
falsehoods cause tremendous harm to a victim’s reputation and infringe on the public interest in reliable information and other honest social campaigns. Efficient removal mechanisms preserve the

497. Lavi, supra note 54, at 887.
498. See, e.g., Jamillah Bowman Williams, Lisa Singh & Naomi Mezey, #MeToo as Catalyst:
A Glimpse into 21st Century Activism, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 371, 371 (2019) (discussing how
the #MeToo movement has used Twitter to spread sexual harassment and abuse allegations).
499. See Anita Raj, Worried About Sexual Harassment – or False Allegations? Our Team Asked
Americans About Their Experiences and Beliefs, THE CONVERSATION (May 13, 2019), https:
//theconversation.com/worried-about-sexual-harassment-or-false-allegations-our-teamasked-americans-about-their-experiences-and-beliefs%E2%80%A6 (“[F]alse allegations of
sexual harassment and assault against high-profile individuals are a growing public concern. . . . [O]ne in 20 women and one in 12 men felt that most or all of the allegations in
recent high-profile cases were ‘false and that accusers are purposefully lying for attention or
money.’”).
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balance between freedom of expression, protection of reputation,
and public interest in the viral age, while avoiding a disproportionate chilling effect.
Moreover, removal from all profiles and locations is ex#post facto.
Thus, the post and its replications would remain available to the
public at least until someone requests that the intermediary or
publisher take them down. The gravity of harm that can be caused
by viral dissemination of false allegations justifies efficient removal
mechanisms, even if legitimate posts might be mistakenly removed
ex post facto.
Fifth, it can be argued that efficient removal mechanisms could
be abused by political or ideological groups that use these mechanisms to silence competing political campaigns, thereby causing
injury to the marketplace of ideas. 500 Although efficient removal
mechanisms can be abused by political and ideological groups to
silence opposing ideologies, adopting this solution leads to a better
balance between rights than its absence, where falsehoods disseminate virally without redress. In addition, the result is not as severe
as might appear at first glance, since legal liability would not be
imposed on the intermediary (even if legislators amend § 230) or
the publisher for avoiding the removal of legitimate posts upon notice. Publishers and intermediaries might risk liability and avoid
removing posts that are not absolutely false since they are protected by legal defenses to defamation. They might risk liability in or501
der to promote their ideology or enhance profits. In fact, not
every item that users complain about is removed, as media giants
use moderators that review complaints about offensive content and
502
do not automatically remove every post upon complaint.
F. A Remark on Smartphone Social Network Applications
This Article focuses on online intermediaries. Therefore, social
network applications for smartphones, such as WhatsApp, are beyond its scope. Yet, dissemination of falsehood through
smartphone apps is very common. A “notice-and-takedown” regime
500. In a related context, people abuse reporting systems on offensive contact to silence
legitimate political campaigns. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 49, at 37–39.
501. In the context of the EU “right to be forgotten” and removal of links to irrelevant
search results on EU citizens, “Google received over 160,000 removal requests and denied a
majority (approximately 58%) of them.” Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role
of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1024 (2016).
502. Klonick, supra note 298, at 2433 (“[M]oderators are trained to determine if content
violates the Community Standards. If a moderator determines that reported content is in
violation, it is removed from the site; all content not found in violation remains published
on the platform.”); see also GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 120–28.
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cannot apply to them, though. Apps are similar to common carriers; their programmers are not normally responsible for defamatory statements transmitted through them since they have no editori503
al control.
Nevertheless, the proposed solutions, which focus on the design
stage, are not limited to online intermediaries and can be applied
to related smartphone applications. Thus, application providers
can program the application to nudge users for accountability as
well. Similar to intermediaries, many application providers can be
incentivized to adopt this solution as part of their business model
because offensive content is a potential threat to their profits.
The second solution of efficient removal is expected to require a
significant change. Unlike Facebook and Twitter, the popular messaging app WhatsApp, which boasts hundreds of millions of active
504
users, was not designed to allow efficient removal. It was not until
2017 that WhatsApp started to allow users to delete messages from
recipient’s devices. At first, the framework for deletion was seven
minutes from message transmission, and it was gradually extended
505
to thirteen hours. If the recipient shares the content within this
timeframe, the message is not likely to be deleted from the devices
through which the message was shared and can still spread widely.
Moreover, the removal mechanism does not currently delete all
506
types of media from recipient devices. Technology should not be
taken for granted; therefore, the proposed solution of efficient
removal should be developed for smartphone apps as well.
Since messages in apps are end-to-end encrypted, apps neither
operate editorial control over nor bear responsibility for the con507
tent. In this context, the victim of transmitted defamatory remarks would have to request removal from the original publisher.
Designing the sharing feature of apps in a way that allows removal
503. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 222, at 7. For further discussion of common carrier
status, see Lavi, supra note 54, at 865.
504. Number of Monthly Active Whatsapp Users Worldwide from April 2013 to February 2016 (in
Millions), STATISTA (Apr. 30, 2020), http://www.statista.com/statistics/260819/num
ber-of-monthly-active-whatsapp-users/; Number of Daily Active WhatsApp Status Users from 1st
Quarter 2017 to 1st Quarter 2019 (in Millions), STATISTA (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.
statista.com/statistics/730306/whatsapp-status-dau/ (referring to 500 million daily active
users).
505. See Manoj Sharma, WhatsApp Sets Over 13-hour Window to Delete Message for Everyone
Permanently, BUS. TODAY (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.businesstoday.in/technology/news
/whatsapp-sets-13hour-window-to-delete-message-for-everyone-permanently/story
/285164.html.
506. See Mohit Kumar, WhatsApp ‘Delete for Everyone’ Doesn’t Delete Media Files Sent to iPhone
Users (Sept. 16, 2019), https://thehackernews.com/2019/09/whatsapp-delete-for-everyoneprivacy.html.
507. See Citron, supra note 115, at 1088–91 (criticizing this result and arguing that design
choices that amounted to a failure to take reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful
uses of services should not enjoy § 230 immunity).
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from all the devices when the original publisher deletes the message, provides the publisher with an efficient way to remove his
statement. The publisher can remove the defamatory statement in
response to the victim’s warning before a legal defamation suit, or
508
upon his own regret. Furthermore, since the publisher uses his
mobile phone number, the victim can efficiently identify him and
file a libel suit directly against him. In cases where the original
publisher refuses to remove the statement, the plaintiff can seek a
court injunction against him for removal of the message.
This technological solution and similar ones have already been
adopted by some app providers. Messages sent through the popular app Snapchat are deleted by default after a few seconds from
509
both the sender’s and the recipient’s devices. While, there are
ways to save posts on the app, for example, by taking screenshots or
510
using other applications to undo the protection, it is likely that
most users share information by using the sharing feature embedded in the app and do not bypass it because users tend to adhere
511
to technological defaults. Therefore, most messages are likely deleted with the removal of the original post.
Similar to Snapchat, different technological supplements to a
512
user’s e-mail can “un-send” e-mails. The emergence of these apps
that limit dissemination might indicate a shift in market preferences to protect reputations and the general public interest. Arguably, other driving forces outside of the law governing dissemina513
tion and formal regulation would be redundant. But I believe
that there is reason to doubt that this would be the outcome in all
cases. Similarly to intermediaries, there are different kinds of apps
with different business models and attitudes towards content, and
not all of them allow for efficient removal. There may be a need to
incentivize app providers to adopt this solution. Providers of apps
that are end-to-end encrypted lack editorial control over state-

508. The original disseminator may agree to remove a statement that has gone out of
control if he did not spread it with malice but rather believed it to be true and discovered
that it was inaccurate later on. Alternatively, the original disseminator may remove the
statement in response to a libel suit.
509. See Tal Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 115,
167 (2015).
510. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 354, at 135 (explaining that the FTC charged Snapchat
with deceiving its users for claiming that messages sent to others would be automatically deleted even though popular applications were available to undo the protection); In re Snapchat Inc., FTC File No C-4501 (Dec. 23, 2014).
511. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 8 (explaining that “people have a strong
tendency to go along with the status quo or default option”).
512. See, e.g., CRIPTEXT, https://www.criptext.com [https://perma.cc/N9UT-WJGG]
(last visited Dec. 20, 2020); VIRTRU, https://www.virtru.com/gmail-encryption/recall-gmailmessages/ [https://perma.cc/YM7L-M4W9 ] (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
513. See Zarsky, supra note 509, at 167.
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ments transmitted over them. Thus, a conditioned “notice-andtakedown” regime would not be applicable. Mandatory design
standards for apps are a possible solution, but this may not be an
optimal solution with respect to apps. The range of uses of social
network apps may be different from online platforms. Thus, there
is no need for efficient content removal mechanisms with respect
514
to all types of social network apps. Design standards may not be
sensitive to the differences between apps and may lack flexibility,
hindering efficiency and chilling innovation.
Furthermore, end-to-end encrypted apps for secured messaging
that are used by mobile devices, such as WhatsApp are considered
closed spaces relative to online platforms. The content transmitted
through them is less searchable, and, by default, it is difficult to
515
find it by search engines. Although falsehoods can spread among
WhatsApp groups rapidly, the scope of harm may be narrower and
the necessity of mandates with respect to apps is unclear. Any decision about legal regulation of apps would require evaluation of
harm, the likelihood for private ordering, and the potential influences of regulation on innovation. For the time being, this Article
leaves the question of mandatory incentives for app providers
open.
CONCLUSION
Dissemination of content is more common today than ever before. The rise of social network platforms and their new information sharing features have increased the circulation of content
exponentially by making sharing as easy as the click of a button.
Each and every individual can spread almost any message he wants,
as long as he could get a crowd to listen. Within seconds, a message
or a post can travel around the world and be viewed by thousands
of users. While online dissemination affords many benefits, it can
infringe upon important values. Content disseminated may include
falsehoods, defamation, and risk: harm to the victim’s reputation
and his standing as an equal member of society, economic loss,

514. For example, app providers may develop social network apps for professional uses
in specific organizations. See, e.g., Chris Welch, Microsoft’s Latest ‘Garage’ Project Is a DeadSimple Email App for iPhone, THE VERGE (July 22, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/7
/22/9013885/microsoft-send-email-app-announced.
515. See Lisa Vaas, Google Stops Indexing WhatsApp Chats; Other Search Engines Still at It,
NAKED SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2020), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/02/25/googlestops-indexing-whatsapp-chats-other-search-engines-still-at-it/ (noting that secured private
messaging should not be found on search engines, whereas messages sent via group chats
should be difficult to find).
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and severe emotional harm. Moreover, the damage caused by dissemination of falsehoods extends beyond private individuals, as it
becomes more difficult to separate truth from falsehood and engage in truthful discussions on matters of public importance,
thereby impinging upon the general public interest.
The widespread dissemination of falsehoods online poses complex challenges to legislators, courts and policy makers. This Article has endeavored to identify potential remedies to meet the challenges posed by spreading falsehoods on social networks. Policy
discussions on this issue thus far have failed to account for human
motivations to spread falsehoods, the social dynamics of networks,
and the influence of intermediaries on the flow of information.
Only by understanding the social dynamics and motivations behind spreading falsehoods can a solution be developed. Analysis of
the way falsehoods spread constitutes an indispensable step towards fully acknowledging the challenges and potential solutions.
As the influence of intermediaries on the flow of information
becomes a fundamental aspect of any platform, their duties should
be reconsidered. The proposed solutions for mitigating the harm
of dissemination of falsehoods focus on the design stage of platforms. The first solution utilizes choice architecture and nudges to
dissuade users from sharing falsehoods ex ante. The second solution utilizes code to allow efficient removal of falsehoods from every profile and location where they were shared ex post facto. Under
this solution, unless intermediaries develop efficient removal techniques for mitigating harmful content shared via publish, share,
and re-tweet buttons, they would lose § 230 immunity.
Outlining fair and efficient regulation of dissemination of falsehoods is one of the most prominent challenges of the digital era.
The analysis and solutions proposed here have vast potential to
meet this challenge and improve the current regulatory regime.
The solutions are important, especially in light of the influence of
falsehoods on political views, voters election results, and democracy. This Article is not the last word on the topic, as digital dissemination creates new risks to reputation and the public interest.
There are further avenues of analytic inquiry on the power of intermediaries and their influence on the flow of information.
Should intermediaries bear additional duties and obligations in
light of their influence? And if so, what should be the normative
framework and scope of these duties? What should be the scope of
§ 230 CDA’s immunity? Should the law impose transparency and
due process obligations on intermediaries, even though they are
private actors? These challenges and others await another day.

